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Microinvestment Disputes
Perry S. Bechky*
ABSTRACT
Salini v. Morocco sparked one of the liveliest controversies
in the dynamic field of international investment disputes. Salini
held that the word "investment" in the Convention establishing
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), although undefined, has an objective meaning that
limits the ability of member states to submit disputes to ICSID
arbitration. The Salini debate is central to this field because it
shapes the nature, purpose, and volume of ICSID arbitration-
and also determines who gets to decide those matters. In
particular, Salini's decision to include "a contribution to
development" as an element of its objective definition of
investment transformed development promotion from a
generalized goal of ICSID as an institution into a jurisdictional
requirement for each case.
This Article introduces the concept of a microinvestment
dispute, which focuses attention on small investments giving
rise to ICSID cases. The microinvestment lens reveals the
failings of Salini's contribution- to-development prong. By
conditioning ICSID jurisdiction on an individualized showing
of such a contribution, this prong disproportionately burdens
microinvestors, inhibiting their access to ICSID despite the fact
that the drafters of the ICSID Convention specifically rejected a
minimum size requirement. In so doing, the development prong
also limits ICSID's value to those who need it most. In the name
of promoting development, Salini may well undercut it.
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of the cases discussed in this article, although I did not personally work on any of them.
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In addition, this Article also offers a "third way"
alternative to both Salini's objectivity and pure subjectivity.
This alternative-bounded deference-draws on the principles
of autonomy, consent, and good faith to strike a better balance
between states and arbitral tribunals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"[Aifter all, [a] person's a person, no matter how small."
- Horton the Elephant. 1
Is an investment an investment, no matter how small? In the
context of international investment disputes, this question matters
because the jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of
1. DR. SEUSS, HORTON HEARS A WHO! (1954).
[VOL. 45:10431044
MICROINVESTMENT DISPUTES
Investment Disputes (ICSID or the Centre) hinges on the meaning of
investment.2
Nothing in the text of the ICSID Convention excludes small
investments (or small claims) from the Centre's jurisdiction or
otherwise discriminates against small investments. 3 Indeed, the
negotiating history reveals the conscious rejection of proposals
excluding small disputes and small investments from the Centre's
reach.4
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention gives ICSID jurisdiction
over "any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between
a Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting State,
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the
Centre."5 Yet the Convention omits any definition of investment.
Through 2000, "there ha[d] been almost no cases where the
notion of investment within the meaning of Article 25 of the
Convention was raised. '6 In 2001, in Salini v. Morocco, an ICSID
tribunal held that the "investment requirement" has objective content
limiting ICSID jurisdiction.7 The tribunal added:
The doctrine generally considers that investment infers:
[i] contributions, [ii] a certain duration of performance of the contract
and [iii] a participation in the risks of the transaction. . . . In reading
the Convention's preamble, one may add [iv] the contribution to the
economic development of the host State of the investment as an
additional condition. 8
The tribunal in Salini went on to note, "In reality, these various
elements may be interdependent" and they "should be assessed
globally even if, for the sake of reasoning, the Tribunal considers
them individually here."9 The tribunal then determined that the
claimant satisfied each of the four elements and "[c]onsequently ...
consider[ed]" that the claimant had made an investment within the
2. In this article, I italicize a word when talking about the word instead of
using the word in the ordinary way. For example: Smith made an investment; the
tribunal construed investment. Here, investment is shorthand for "the word
'investment."'
3. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. ICSID Convention, supra note 3, art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
6. Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001), translated in 42 I.L.M. 609
(2003). All arbitral decisions cited herein are available from https://icsid.worldbank.org
or http://italaw.com.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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meaning of Article 25.10 Notwithstanding Salini's call for sensitivity
in examining the elements "globally," later tribunals have generally
attributed to Salini the creation of a four-part "test."1 1 Some
tribunals have followed "the Salini test"112 other tribunals have
rejected it, 13 while still others have suggested modifying it into
three-,14 five-, 15 and six-part tests. 16 Some tribunals have changed
one or more of the Salini criteria, insisting, for example, that the
investor must contribute "substantial" assets or must make a
"significant" contribution to the development of the host state.1 7 Some
tribunals have returned to the idea of a global assessment-
sometimes to expand access to ICSID, sometimes to restrict it.18 The
Salini test thus remains at the center of a lively debate between
10. Id. T 53-58.
11. See, e.g., Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5,
Award, 7 39 n.18, 81-83 (Apr. 15, 2009) (describing Salini as "seminal"). It might be
noted that this attribution developed and persists notwithstanding the fact that
another tribunal adopted a similar approach several years earlier and in circumstances
where the investment question was much more present than in Salini. Compare Salini,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 57 (concerning a highway
construction project whose "contribution... to the economic development of the
Moroccan State cannot seriously be questioned"), with Fedax N.V. v. Republic of
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 43 (July 11, 1997)
(concerning promissory notes). For more on Fedax, see infra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic
of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 7 130-38 (Nov. 14,
2005) (applying a four-part "Salini test").
13. See, e.g., Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 364 (Aug. 4, 2011) ("[T]he Tribunal does not see
any merit in following and copying the Salini criteria."); M.C.I. Power Grp. L.C. v.
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, 165 (July 31, 2007) ("[T]he
requirements that were taken into account in some arbitral precedents for purposes of
denoting the existence of an investment.., must be considered as mere examples and
not necessarily as elements that are required for its existence.").
14. See, e.g., Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award,
110-14 (July 14, 2010) (accepting the first three Salini criteria, while reviewing and
rejecting other candidates).
15. See, e.g., Joy Mining Mach., Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 53 (Aug. 6, 2004) (adding to the Salini criteria a
requirement of "regularity of profit and return").
16. See, e.g., Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 114 (adding
to the Salini criteria requirements that assets must be invested bona fide (i.e., in good
faith) and in conformity with the domestic laws of the host state).
17. See, e.g., Helnan Int'l Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/19, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, 77 (Oct. 17, 2006) ("[T]o be
characterized as an investment, a project must show ... [inter alia] a substantial
commitment and a significant contribution to the host State's development." (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The subsequent award for the
respondent was partially annulled on other grounds. Helnan Int'l Hotels A/S v. Arabic
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on Annulment, 73 (June 14,
2010).
18. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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objectivists and subjectivists, and among the former.19 This debate is
crucial to shaping ICSID's docket and, more, its character.
20
This Article problematizes Salini and especially its fourth prong,
which requires an investment to "contribut[e] to the economic
development of the host State" as a condition of access to ICSID
arbitration.21 It does this by focusing on Salini's impact on
microinvestment disputes, a concept introduced here. 2
2 Criticism of
the development prong is not new-indeed, Christoph Schreuer has
called this "the most controversial" part of Salini.23 Yet, the
microinvestment lens reveals new problems with the development
prong: it imposes a backdoor size requirement that inhibits access to
ICSID by microinvestors who may have the greatest need for such
access, thereby harming ICSID's ability to fulfill its objectives,
including development promotion. This article thus critiques Salini's
fourth prong from the perspectives of text, negotiating history,
teleology, and such fundamental policies as access to justice and
contribution to development itself.
In keeping with Article 25, a microinvestment dispute is a legal
dispute arising directly out of a microinvestment, between a state and
a foreign investor. A microinvestment, in turn, is an investment worth
less than $5 million 24 made by an individual, a microenterprise, or a
19. Judge Shahabuddeen framed this debate more starkly: "The cleavage
[between the "subjectivist" and "objectivist" views of investment] marks a titanic
struggle between ideas, and correspondingly between capital exporting countries and
capital importing ones." Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/10, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, 62 (Feb.
19, 2009).
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001), translated in 42 I.L.M. 609
(2003).
22. The word microinvestment and its corollary microinvestor owe a debt to the
better-established microfinance and, especially, microenterprise.
23. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY
131 (2d ed. 2009).
24. According to Susan Franck's data set of awards in investment treaty
arbitrations rendered (and made available publicly) before June 1, 2006, forty-four
awards quantified the damages claimed, with the amounts sought varying from
approximately $155,314 to $9.4 billion. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating
Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 16-17, 57 (2007). The
mode and median claims were $50 million and approximately $59 million, respectively,
while the mean was significantly higher at approximately $343 million. Id. at 58 &
n.254. The $5 million threshold for microinvestment is much smaller than the average
claim, clearly low enough that investors with qualifying disputes can be expected to
experience difficulties related to the small size of the investment in dispute. See infra
text accompanying notes 238-45 (discussing these difficulties). At the same time, this
threshold is also high enough to identify a meaningful number of qualifying cases. By
way of comparison, a threshold of $1 million would capture only one case actually filed
at ICSID. See infra Part IV.B (discussing this one case).
20121 1047
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small or medium enterprise (SME).25 This definition focuses on
claims arising from microinvestments, not on small claims per se,
which may arise from investments of any size. The point is to identify
cases that are, despite their small size, genuinely important to the
business concerned. The importance of a dispute about an
investment-and hence the investor's need for access to ICSID-is a
function of the size of the claim relative to the value of the
investment. Simply put, a large company is better able than a small
company to bear a loss of the same amount. 26 While a loss of $5
million would give rise to "bet the company" litigation for many
companies, the same loss only gives rise to an "ordinary business
dispute" for larger companies. Where a smaller company may have
urgent need in a $5 million case for the effectiveness and neutrality
promised by international arbitration, a larger company may be
willing to litigate it in domestic court or even write off the loss
altogether in the pursuit of other, larger business dealings with the
25. In this regard, it should be noted that claims by individuals (e.g., Alex
Genin, Antoine Goetz) and relatively small companies (e.g., Asian Agricultural
Products Ltd., Vacuum Salt Products Ltd.) join those of business giants (e.g., ADM,
Shell) in populating the ICSID universe. See List of Concluded Cases, ICSID,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionV
al=ListConcluded (last updated Oct. 10, 2012).
As to the definitions of microenterprise and SME, according to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
SMEs are generally considered to be non-subsidiary, independent firms which
employ fewer than a given number of employees. This number varies across
countries. The most frequent upper limit designating an SME is 250 employees,
as in the European Union. However, some countries set the limit at 200, while
the United States considers SMEs to include firms with fewer than 500
employees. Small firms are mostly considered to be firms with fewer than 50
employees while micro-enterprises have at most ten, or in some cases, five
employees.
OECD, SME AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP OUTLOOK 2005, at 17 (2005) [hereinafter OECD
OUTLOOK]; see also ToM GIBSON & H.J. VAN DER VAART, DEFINING SMES: A LESS
IMPERFECT WAY OF DEFINING SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 4-8 (2008) (surveying definitions of SME). The traditional emphasis on
employment may need updating. See id. at 12-15 (arguing for revenues as a better
criterion than employment or assets). The European Union and World Bank use both
employment and financial criteria. Id. at 5; OECD OUTLOOK, supra; cf. 15 U.S.C.
§ 6901(10) (2006) (specifying that microenterprises employ "fewer than 5 employees"
and "generally lack access to conventional loans, equity, or other banking services").
26. The materiality concept from U.S. securities law makes a helpful analogy,
as a loss of $5 million might be material to a small company but not to a larger
company. See 4 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES
REGULATION 613-60 & n.436 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the concept of materiality and
noting a case in which "$6.8 million was immaterial [because] this amount represented
only 2% of [the company's] total assets" (quoting Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122
F.3d 539, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1997))).
[VOL.45-1043
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country concerned. 27 This is why the definition of microinvestment
dispute excludes claims by large businesses.2 8 In principle, then, the
definition is tied to the size of both the investment and the investor,
not to the amount in controversy. In practice, however, data about the
size of the investment and the investor is often unavailable, and the
amount in controversy serves as a proxy for the (claimed) value of the
investment, because most cases allege the taking or (nearly) complete
destruction of the investment.2 9 Ultimately, the aim of this Article is
more to introduce the concept of a microinvestment dispute than to fix
its exact definition-that is, to establish that a real class of these
disputes exists, and regardless of its precise parameters, it matters
how ICSID treats them.
It matters, of course, to injured microinvestors whether they
have access to an effective mechanism for dispute settlement. It
matters systemically as well, for microinvestors' collective economic
power is awesome, they may have the greatest need for access to
ICSID, and their investment may be chilled the most by lack of that
access.
30
Part II of this Article introduces ICSID and its jurisdiction,
stressing the investment and consent requirements and the
relationships between them. It argues for replacing Salini's objective
approach with an approach of bounded deference, which permits
member states, through the power of consent, to determine the scope
of investment for a given case within the bounds of good faith. Part III
describes ICSID's purposes, particularly the aim to promote
development, and argues that those purposes do not justify Salini's
development prong. Part IV surveys the landscape of
microinvestment disputes and examines Salini's impact on two recent
microinvestment disputes: Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia.
Part V critiques Salini's development prong from the
microinvestment perspective. The Article then concludes in Part VI.
27. In this regard, an in-house counsel at a Fortune 500 company that deals
extensively with states once said to me, "We would rather eat dirt than bring one of
these [ICSID] cases."
28. I acknowledge that the argument for excluding large businesses could be
extended to claims by wealthy individuals as well.
29. I acknowledge that this proxy is imperfect. To determine whether a
particular case genuinely qualifies as a microinvestment dispute as defined here, it
may be necessary to drill into data beyond what is included in an award. For example,
in Petrobart Ltd. V. Krygz Republic, the claimant sought about $4 million, but it is a
natural gas distribution company and so may well be too large to qualify as an SME.
Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Rep., Arb. No. 126/2003, Award, 4, 78 (Arb. Inst. of the
Stockholm Chamber of Comm. 2005).
30. See discussion infra Part V.
20121 1049
VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
In offering this microinvestment critique of Salini's development
prong, this Article does not contend that this jurisdictional hurdle is
the chief impediment to the successful prosecution of
microinvestment claims. The economics of these claims are inherently
challenging-they invoke expensive procedures in pursuit of (by
definition) small recoveries-and are worsened by the risk that a
tribunal may subject an unsuccessful microinvestor to the "loser
pays" rule.31 A full treatment of the economics of microinvestment
disputes is beyond the scope of this Article. The contention here is
that Salini's development prong unnecessarily and inappropriately
adds to the inherent burdens on microinvestors' access to ICSID.
II. ICSID AND ITS JURISDICTION
A. A Brief Introduction to ICSID
ICSID was created by multilateral treaty in 1966.32 It has 147
member states today.33 ICSID is an "autonomous international
institution,"34 but it is closely related to the World Bank: the Bank
conceived of ICSID and sponsored the talks leading to its creation,
the Bank houses ICSID at its headquarters, and the Bank's president
serves ex officio as chairman of ICSID's Administrative Council and is
responsible for nominating ICSID's secretary-general (a position
occupied until 2009 by the Bank's general counsel).35
ICSID's primary purpose is to facilitate the resolution of disputes
between international investors and member states. It resolves
disputes through either arbitration or conciliation, but the former
dominates its docket.36 ICSID has no standing decisional bodies.
31. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
32. About ICSID, ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org ("The ICSID Convention is
a multilateral treaty .... It was opened for signature on March 18, 1965 and entered
into force on October 14, 1966.") (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
33. Member States, ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
34. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. [IBRD], Report of the Executive
Directors on the Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, 15 (Mar. 18, 1965) [hereinafter Executive Directors'
Report], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFilesbasicdoc/partB.htm.
35. See ICSID Convention, supra note 3, arts. 2, 5, 10(1) (establishing ICSID
with numerous connections to the World Bank); Executive Directors' Report, supra note
34, 1-8, 15-18 (describing the role the World Bank had in the creation of ICSID).
36. Through 2011, ICSID has heard only seven conciliations, accounting for
only 2 percent of ICSID cases. ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD-STATISTICS 8 (2012-1),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal
=CaseLoadStatistics [hereinafter ICSID CASELOAD].
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Independent ad hoc tribunals are constituted to decide a single case. 37
The ICSID Secretariat performs vital work to support the tribunals,
but it has no decisional responsibility (apart from the secretary-
general's "limited power to 'screen"' cases that are "obviously outside
the jurisdiction of the Centre").38
ICSID awards are binding on the parties.39 ICSID has a unique
provision for the enforcement of its arbitral awards, which obliges
each member state to enforce ICSID awards as if they were final
judgments of its own domestic courts. 40 To avoid giving tribunals
absolutely unreviewable authority, the ICSID Convention created the
annulment process, which allows quasi-appellate review on five
specified grounds by an "ad hoc Committee" appointed by the
President of the World Bank.41
Access to international adjudication traditionally had been
reserved to states, as remains the case today at the International
Court of Justice. 42 A private business injured by a foreign state in
violation of international standards had to persuade its home state to
"espouse" the claim, which international law then regarded as the
home state's to control and dispose.43 ICSID represented a profound
37. See ICSID Convention, supra note 3, arts. 37-49 (addressing the
constitution, powers, and functions of the tribunals).
38. Executive Directors' Report, supra note 34, 20 (paraphrasing ICSID
Convention, supra note 3, art. 36(3)).
39. ICSID Convention, supra note 3, art. 53.
40. Compare Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, art. V, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter New York Convention] (listing grounds for refusing enforcement of an
award in international commercial arbitration), with ICSID Convention, supra note 3,
art. 54(1) ("Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State."). See
generally 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (2006) ("The pecuniary obligations imposed by [an ICSID]
award... shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States."); Roger P.
Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 675, 687-99 (2003) (arguing that ICSID awards enjoy higher status in
domestic law than do the judgments of any other international tribunal).
41. See ICSID Convention, supra note 3, arts. 5, 52 (establishing the
annulment process); SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 23, at 890-1095 (explaining and
analyzing the annulment process).
42. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1), June 26, 1945,
3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 1055 ("Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.").
43. See, for example, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.),
1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30):
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to
protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law
committed by another State .... By taking up the case of one of its
subjects ... , a State is in reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure,
in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law .... Once
2012] 1051
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step from this traditional conception of international law toward
transnational law with meaningful participation by nonstate actors.
44
Investors received a direct right of arbitral action against host
states-a remarkable legal right to act on the international plane
independent of their home state-with the opportunity to secure an
award uniquely powerful in domestic courts.45 Host states received
"radical" restrictions on diplomatic protection,46 which often involved
diplomatic pressure and was "sometimes followed by the use of
force," 47 for matters submitted to ICSID arbitration. 48 In other words,
to borrow from John Jackson, host states, especially developing
countries, benefitted from a move away from "power-oriented" toward
"rules-oriented" dispute settlement.49 Home states were freed from
the diplomatic costs of involvement in investor disputes with other
states. Thus, one of ICSID's major objectives is to "depoliticize"
investment disputes by treating them more like ordinary legal
disputes. 5 0
a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an
international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant.
Id.; see also L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 291 (2d ed. 1912) ("[I1f
individuals who possess nationality are wronged abroad, it is their home State only
and exclusively which has a right to ask for redress, and these individuals themselves
have no such right."); id. §§ 13, 63, 288-92 (stressing that private persons are not
subjects, but objects, of international law, with no rights thereunder).
44. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 2
(1948) (arguing that "international law, like national law, must be directly applicable
to the individual" and that this is one of the two "keystones of a revised international
legal order"); PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2-3 & n.6 (1956) ("Having argued
in 1948 that [recognizing individuals as subjects of international law] was a desirable
position. . . , I am prepared to say it is now established."); cf. Aron Broches, The
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 331 (1972), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS:
WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 188, 198 (1995) ("[T]he m6st striking feature of the Convention is that it firmly
establishes the capacity of a private individual or a corporation to proceed directly
against a State in an international forum, thus contributing to the growing recognition
of the individual as a subject of international law.").
45. See sources cited supra note 40.
46. IBRAHIM SHIHATA, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment
Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD
313, 323-24 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1st ed. 1991).
47. Id. at 309.
48. See ICSID Convention, supra note 3, art. 27 (barring diplomatic protection
for matters submitted to ICSID arbitration unless the respondent lost the arbitration
and refused to comply with the award).
49. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2d ed. 1997)
(analyzing the roles of power and rules in international dispute settlement).
50. SHIHATA, supra note 46, at 313 ("[ICSID] ... attempts in particular to
'depoliticize' the settlement of investment disputes.").
[VOL. 45:1043
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ICSID arbitration, like other forms of arbitration, is a creature of
consent.5 1 The state's consent may be expressed in several ways, but
over the past twenty-and, especially, ten-years, ICSID's docket has
come to be dominated by cases where the state unilaterally
preconsented in a treaty, mainly in a bilateral investment treaty
(BIT). In a BIT, each party grants substantive rights to investors
from the other party, typically including fair and equitable treatment,
national treatment, and a promise to pay compensation for any
expropriation. 52 The parties also typically consent to international
arbitration at ICSID or other fora (or both) over any dispute
submitted by an investor from the other party alleging a violation of
the BIT.53 The state's preconsent by treaty empowers qualifying
investors to initiate arbitration at one of the specified fora by
consenting themselves just before filing a claim.54 Treaty-based cases
transformed ICSID's docket, now vastly larger than in the recent
past.5 5 They "are to ICSID what Prince Charming was to Sleeping
Beauty, having stirred the activities of the Centre. '56
B. ICSID Jurisdiction and the Case for Bounded Deference
As mentioned, ICSID has jurisdiction over legal disputes "arising
directly from an investment," but the ICSID Convention does not
51. See infra text accompanying notes 74-79 (discussing the role of consent in
ICSID jurisdiction).
52. See generally RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 58-65, 108-14 (1995) (describing provisions often found in
BITs).
53. Id. at 129-30. Absent state consent to investor-state arbitration, the
traditional norms of espousal, discussed supra note 43, survive into the ICSID era. See,
e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 79
(Feb. 5) ("The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection
will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease.... [T]he State
enjoys complete freedom of action.").
54. The possibility of such "nonsynchronous consent" was contemplated at
ICSID's creation, see Executive Directors' Report, supra note 34, at 24 (giving
examples of permissible means of consent), and there have been a handful of cases
premised upon consent expressed in domestic statutes. See ICSID CASELOAD, supra
note 36, at 10 (showing that 6 percent of ICSID cases are based on statutory consent).
It was only in 1990 that an ICSID tribunal first exercised jurisdiction based upon state
consent expressed in a treaty. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/8713, Final Award, 2 (June 27, 1990), 6
ICSID Rev. 526, 527 (1991) (relying on Sri Lanka's consent in a BIT). See generally Jan
Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 232 (1995).
55. See ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 36, at 7, 10 (showing that 81 percent of
ICSID cases have been registered since 2000 and 74 percent are treaty-based).
56. Forji Amin George, By Their Provisions, You Can Know Them,
BILATERALS.ORG (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article6366
(quoting Eloise Obadia).
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define the crucial .term investment. The negotiating history reveals
ample discussion of the issue.5 7  Of particular relevance to
microinvestments, the negotiators debated whether to exclude small
investments or small disputes from ICSID jurisdiction. "In fact, [an
early text] provided that. . . the Centre would not exercise
jurisdiction in respect of disputes involving claims of less than US
$100,000." s58 Other "delegates felt that the total value of the
investment and not the claim under dispute should be
determinative."5 9 Still others favored procedural mechanisms, such as
screening by the secretary-general or the investor's home state "to
shield the Centre from insignificant claims. °6 0 None of these
proposals prevailed, however. Unable to agree to a definition of
investment, the negotiators agreed instead to omit one.
6 1
Throughout the negotiations, Aron Broches6 2 opposed the efforts
to define investment. In part, like Justice Potter Stewart's famous
57. The first draft of the Convention included a definition of investment as "any
contribution of money or other assets of economic value for an indefinite period or, if
the period be defined, for not less than five years." SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 115.
The secretariat later revised the definition to read:
[T]he acquisition of (i) property rights or contractual rights (including rights
under a concession) for the establishment or in the conduct of an industrial,
commercial, agricultural, financial or service enterprise; (ii) participations or
shares in any such enterprise; or (iii) financial obligations of a public or private
entity other than obligations arising out of short-term banking or credit
facilities.
Id. at 115. For a thorough discussion of the ICSID negotiating history as it pertains to
investment, see Julian Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment"- ICSID's Travaux and
the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 280-96 (2010).
58. SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 115. In constant dollars, $100,000 in 1965 is
worth about $731,000 in 2012. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/datalinflationcalculator.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
59. SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 116. Mortenson added:
The first draft of the Convention imposed a minimum $100,000 amount in
dispute as a jurisdictional prerequisite. The dollar minimum was withdrawn in
the next draft, and despite occasional expressions of concern that it might leave
ICSID open to "small or frivolous" disputes, it was never reinstated .... The
same held true for all efforts to impose a substantiality requirement on the
investment itself.
Mortenson, supra note 57, at 297-98 (emphasis added).
60. SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 116.
61. Id. at 115.
62. Broches was the general counsel of the World Bank at the time, in which
position he was one of the main architects of the ICSID Convention. When ICSID came
into existence, Broches also served as its first secretary-general. ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 539 (2d ed. 2008).
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description of pornography, 63 Broches regarded investment as difficult
to define but easy to recognize. 64 More fundamentally, Broches
argued that a definition was "danger[ous]," because
recourse to the services of the Center might in a given situation be
precluded because the dispute in question did not precisely qualify
under'the definition .... There was the further danger that a definition
might provide a reluctant party with an opportunity to frustrate or
delay the proceedings by questioning whether the dispute was
encompassed by the definition.6 5
Broches thus objected to the wrangling that would follow from
defining investment, deeming jurisdictional details best left to each
member state to decide which cases to submit to ICSID.66 Broches
made this point repeatedly-and specifically in opposition to a
minimum-dollar-value requirement.6 7
One possible reading of the ICSID Convention, then, is that the
undefined word in Article 25 places no independent restraint on a
member state's freedom to refer disputes to ICSID-that investment's
definition is wholly subjective and member states enjoy complete
discretion to manufacture jurisdiction through consent.6 8 The report
63. Justice Stewart wrote:
[Flaced with the task of trying to define what may be indefinable.... I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description [i.e., hard-core pornography]; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it ....
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 114, 116.
65. Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Decision on Annulment, 67 (Apr. 16, 2009) (quoting INT'L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER
STATES 54 (1968)). In a similar vein, the staff comment to the October 1963 draft
convention expressed concern that defining investment would "open the door to
frequent disagreements" about jurisdiction. Mortenson, supra note 57, at 282-83.
66. See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 114-16 (discussing Broches's views).
67. Id. at 115-16. Mortenson added:
As the Bank drafters explained in their elimination of "lower limit[s]" from the
draft circulated to the Consultative Meetings of Legal Experts, "the parties
would in practice be best qualified to decide whether, having regard to
pertinent facts and circumstances including the value of the subject-matter, a
dispute is one which ought to be submitted to the Center.
Mortenson, supra note 57, at 298.
68. One recent case may subscribe to this view. See Abaclat v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 364
(Aug. 4, 2011). The tribunal in Abaclat explained:
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on the Convention prepared by the executive directors of the World
Bank provides some support for the subjective view, as it states: "No
attempt was made to define the term 'investment' 69 given the
essential requirement of consent by the parties, and the mechanism
through which Contracting States can make known in advance, if
they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would not
consider submitting to the Centre .... ,,70 But the same report also
undercuts any construction that deprives the word "investment" of all
jurisdictional significance,71 as do both the rule of effectiveness 72 and
state practice under the Convention. 73
If Claimants' contributions were to fail the Salini test, those
contributions... would not be given the procedural protection afforded by the
ICSID Convention. The Tribunal finds that such a result would be
contradictory to the ICSID Convention's aim, which is to encourage private
investment while giving the Parties the tools to further define what kind of
investment they want to promote. It would further make no sense in view of
Argentina's and Italy's express agreement [in the BIT at issue] to protect the
value generated by these kinds of contributions.
Id.
69. As Schreuer noted, "Historically, this is, of course, incorrect. There were a
number of attempts but they all failed." SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 116. Mortenson
explained that the "bland description" in the Executive Directors' Report resulted from
Broches's efforts to "appease" a director who opposed the Convention and especially its
approach to investment. Mortenson, supra note 57, at 292-93.
70. Executive Directors'Report, supra note 34, 27 (footnote added).
71. For example, the report stated:
While consent of the parties is an essential prerequisite for the jurisdiction
of the Centre, consent alone will not suffice to bring a dispute within its
jurisdiction. In keeping with the purpose of the Convention, the jurisdiction of
the Centre is further limited by reference to the nature of the dispute and the
parties thereto.
Id. at 25. The key phrase here is "the nature of the dispute," which must refer to the
language in Article 25 about jurisdiction over "any legal dispute arising directly out of
an investment." See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes: Some Observations on Jurisdiction, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 267-68
(1966) (explaining the phrase "the nature of the dispute").
72. The International Law Commission regarded the principle that the
language of a treaty should be given appropriate effect (ut res magis valeat quam
pereat) to be "embodied" in the general rule of treaty interpretation now codified in
Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], laying stress on the obligation to
construe a treaty "in good faith" and "in the light of its object and purpose." Draft
Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMISSION
187, 219.
73. See Vienna Convention, supra note 72, art. 31.3(b) ("There shall be taken
into account ... any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."). It should be
noted that only those customary rules codified in the Vienna Convention, and not the
Convention itself, apply to the ICSID Convention:
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State consent is plainly necessary for ICSID jurisdiction: it is the
"essential prerequisite" for jurisdiction, "the cornerstone of the
jurisdiction of the Centre. ' 74 So central to ICSID's fabric is the
consent requirement that it is manifest three times in the preamble
alone. 75  This consent-centeredness was crucial to overcoming
resistance, especially among Latin American states, to ICSID's
creation. 76 It also anchored ICSID in traditional international legal
norms,77 even as ICSID otherwise broke radically from those norms
by empowering private persons to act in their own interests on the
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present
Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law
independently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which
are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention
with regard to such States.
Id. art. 4. The ICSID Convention creates the Administrative Council of ICSID,
"composed of one representative of each Contracting State," and empowers it to "adopt
the rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration proceedings."
ICSID Convention, supra note 3, arts. 4(1), 6(1)(b). The ICSID rules governing requests
for the institution of arbitral proceedings oblige complainants to specify separately how
both the consent and investment requirements have been satisfied. See INT'L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE INSTITUTION OF
CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, r. 2(1)(c), 2(1)(e); SCHREUER, supra
note 23, at 117 (discussing the two requirements).
74. Executive Directors' Report, supra note 34, at 23, 25; accord Broches,
supra note 44, at 352 ("I want to stress the overriding significance of consent not
merely as a formal requirement for the jurisdiction of the Centre, but as an essential
characteristic of the entire system of the Convention.").
75. See ICSID Convention, supra note 3, pmbl. (making facilities available for
submission by parties "if they so desire" without obliging any state to submit any case
"without its consent," while also recognizing that "mutual consent" once given
"constitutes a binding agreement").
76. See LOWENFELD, supra note 62, at 540-41 (describing the gradual
acceptance of the convention over time).
77. See, e.g., The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7) ("The rules of law binding upon States ... emanate from their own free
will ...."). Eighty-five years later, it remains clear that state consent plays a vital role
in the creation of international legal obligation-most obviously in the case of treaties,
but also for custom and general principles. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, supra note 42, art. 38(1) (listing the sources of international law); LOUIS
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 26-40 (1995) (describing the role
of consent in making international law). Yet, the modern rise of jus cogens, most
notably in the context of human rights law, has diminished markedly Lotus's
suggestion that consent is the only possible constraint on a state's otherwise absolute
freedom to do as it will. See id. at 38-39 & n.*, 176-81. Thus, while consent is
discussed here as an important principle of international law-and one that is
especially relevant to ICSID jurisdiction-nothing in this Article valorizes consent
above basic human values. Cf. Perry S. Bechky, Lemkin's Situation: Toward a
Rhetorical Understanding of Genocide, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 621 (2012)
("Sovereignty, like other governmental constructs, must yield to 'elementary
considerations of humanity."' (quoting Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22
(Apr. 9))).
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international plane. 78 The consent requirement allows each ICSID
member to decide for itself how far to go into the brave new world of
investor claims-to decide how many and what kinds of cases it is
willing to allow investors to bring against it.7 9
With the BIT revolution in ICSID's docket, jurisdictional
disputes now often turn on the scope of the state's consent-that is,
on the definition of protected investment in the relevant investment
treaty.8 0 Deploying the image of Article 25 as a "jurisdictional
keyhole,"' investments covered by the consent clause of an
investment treaty have a key unlocking at least one of two locks on
the door barring access to ICSID arbitration. They may need a second
key to open the investment-requirement lock. Or, one key may open
both locks. Both the investment treaty and ICSID revolve around the
same core word. They may use the word in the same way or they may
use it differently-but it is difficult to reach a conclusion without a
definition in Article 25.32
In these circumstances, ICSID tribunals should presume that
the consent key normally opens both locks.8 3 In other words, they
should take a broad, flexible, and party-centric approach to the
78. See supra note 44.
79. Broches wrote:
The Bank has always stressed the doubly voluntary character of the entire
ICSID scheme: not only are [Bank] members free to join the Centre or not, but
even after they have done so, they are free to decide whether or not to utilize
the Centre's facilities by consenting to its jurisdiction in respect of particular
arrangements or disputes.
Broches, supra note 44, at 348.
80. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. VII(1), Nov. 14, 1991, 1991 U.S.T. Lexis 176, available at
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina-us.pdf (consenting to arbitration
of investment disputes arising under the treaty). The definition of investment in
investment treaties is typically expansive and open-ended. See, e.g., id. art. 1
('[]nvestment' means every kind of investment ... owned or controlled directly or
indirectly..., such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes
without limitation [five types of investment].").
81. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 278-80 (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev. 450, 535-36.
82. For the mathematically inclined, the keyhole imagery may be replaced with
that of a Venn diagram. The question is the degree of overlap between two circles, each
defining investment-a question made much harder to answer by the fact that one of
the circles is, in effect, invisible.
83. Cf. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic (CSOB),
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 66 (May 24, 1999), 14 ICSID
Rev. 250, 274 (describing consent as an "important element in determining whether a
dispute qualifies as an investment," the presence of which "creates a strong
presumption" that a transaction so qualifies).
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definition of investment.8 4 They should approach with a spirit of
modesty and deference the question whether to construe the
undefined word to impose "outer limits"'8 5 on a member state's ability
to submit a dispute to ICSID. They should assess whether a member
state's submission is bona fide, not whether it is correct.8 6 They
should give "great weight" to the member state's understanding of
investment-but they should not deem it "controlling."8 7
Thus, subject to other requirements not here relevant, an ICSID
tribunal should ordinarily exercise jurisdiction to decide any legal
dispute voluntarily submitted to it by the parties, so long as the
dispute arises out of a transaction that may be characterized in good
faith as an investment. This approach comports with the principles of
estoppel8" and pacta sunt servanda.89 And, to borrow an oft-quoted
84. See R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 344 (2005) (describing investment under the Convention
as a "relatively malleable and party-sensitive term"); Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v.
United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 316-17 (Jul. 24,
2008) (advocating a "flexible and pragmatic approach" that construes investment "by
reference to the parties' agreement").
85. Broches, supra note 44, at 351.
86. Cf. Mortenson, supra note 57, at 273 (criticizing "the Salini line" for
deciding correctness rather than reasonableness).
87. Broches, supra note 71, at 268; see Broches, supra note 44, at 362 (declaring
that the "wise decision" to omit a definition of investment "leaves a large measure of
discretion to the parties," but "this discretion is not unlimited and cannot be exercised
to the point of being clearly inconsistent with the purposes of the Convention"); Special
Clauses Relating to the Subject-Matter of the Dispute, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INV. DISPUTES, http:f/icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/model-clauses-en8.htm
(last visited Sep. 27, 2012) ("Parties thus have much, though not unlimited, discretion
....."); see also SGS Socit6 G~n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 133 & n.153 (Aug. 6, 2003), 18
ICSID Rev. 307, 347 ('The ICSID Convention does not delimit the term 'investment,'
leaving to the Contracting Parties a large measure of freedom to define that term as
their specific objectives and circumstances may lead them to do so .... That freedom
does not, however, appear to be unlimited...."); cf. Certain Questions of Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. 136, 145 (June 4) (holding
that, even when a treaty "provide[s] a State... with a very considerable discretion,
this exercise of discretion is still subject to the obligation of good faith codified in
Article 26" of the Vienna Convention).
88. See generally Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6
(finding Thailand precluded from contesting a treaty after having enjoyed its benefits
for fifty years). Even under the narrower view of estoppel recognized by Judge
Spender's dissent, a state may not contest a prior representation on which another
state reasonably relied to its detriment. Id. at 143-44. States have been estopped as
well from contesting prior representations in disputes with private persons. See
Thomas Cottier & Jirg Paul Mifller, Estoppel, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L
LAW, www.mpepil.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
89. See Vienna Convention, supra note 72, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."). Pacta
sunt servanda is "the fundamental principle of the law of treaties," Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, supra note 72, at 211, "an antecedent,
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phrase from the European Court of Human Rights, 90 it appropriately
gives each member state "a margin of appreciation" when defining
investment for the purpose of determining when submitting disputes
to ICSID best suits its own interests. 9 1 The good faith limitation is
unlikely to have much bite in actuality, because only rarely (if ever)
will an ICSID member state submit to ICSID, whether in error or in
bad faith, a dispute that cannot reasonably 92 be regarded as arising
directly out of an investment. The limitation is nevertheless
important in principle, because it anchors the party-centric approach
to the text of Article 25 and the "cardinal injunction"9 3 to construe it
in good faith.94
underlying 'constitutional' principle" on which "the normative character of a treaty
depends." HENKIN, supra note 77, at 28.
90. See generally YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
ECHR (2001); STEVEN GREER, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION: INTERPRETATION AND
DISCRETION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); Yuval
Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2005).
91. See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 117 (advocating an approach in which
member states have "much freedom," but not "unlimited freedom," in deciding what
transactions qualify as investments).
92. Cf. RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 157 (2008) ("[O]ne
component of good faith in interpretation is reasonableness.").
93. Id. at 153 (quoting Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar
v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6, at 39 (Feb. 15) (Schwebel, J., dissenting)).
94. See Vienna Convention, supra note 72, art. 31.1 ("A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith .... "); Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, supra note 72, at 211 ("The motif of good faith, it is true, applies
throughout international relations; but it has a particular importance in the law of
treaties...."); Michel Virally, Good Faith in Public International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 130, 133 (1983) ("[Glood faith presents itself as an absolutely necessary ingredient to
the operation of the whole international legal order .... ").
In this regard, while Mortenson similarly advocated deference to state approaches
to interpreting investment, he went too far in embracing any activity that is "plausibly
economic," a construction that appears to extend in principle beyond a good-faith
construction of investment, although I agree with Mortenson that this scenario would
rarely arise in reality. Mortenson, supra note 57, at 301-10, 315-16. Likewise, Yulia
Andreeva erred by characterizing bilateral definitions of investment as lex specialis.
Yulia Andreeva, Salvaging or Sinking the Investment? MHS v. Malaysia Revisited, 7
LAw & PRAC. OF INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 161, 169 (2008). This characterization, by
operation of the implicit Latin maxim, would permit member states to derogate from
the ICSID Convention.
Conversely, while Georges Abi-Saab appears to have endorsed Salini, we share
much analytical common ground. We agree that the absence of "an express definition of
investment [in Article 25] does not automatically imply that the definition is totally left
to the BITs"; that the undefined word should be construed in accordance with its
ordinary meaning in light of its context and the Convention's object and purpose; and
that investment, "whilst flexible enough, is not infinitely elastic. It leaves much latitude
and a wide margin of interpretation and further specification to States in their BITs;
but not to the point of rendering it totally vacuous, without any legal effect." Abaclat v.
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This party-driven approach presents, to be sure, a radically
different vision of subject-matter jurisdiction than that embraced by
the U.S. federal courts. Litigants may not manufacture federal court
jurisdiction by consent. 95 They cannot waive jurisdictional defects. 96
Indeed, jurisdictional defects may be raised on appeal for the first
time, even by the party that originally invoked federal jurisdiction 97
or sua sponte by the appellate courts.98 But this restrictive view of
jurisdiction-which closes the door to the federal courts, even when
causing inefficiency9 9 or injustice1 0 0-is driven by the particular
needs of the U.S. constitutional system. Litigants may not waive or
change the jurisdictional limits of the federal courts because the
Founders and Congress have created those limits to preserve the
constitutional balance between the national government and the fifty
states. 10 1 No such considerations exist at ICSID. The international
community has no interest in preventing a national government from
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-
Saab, 38-52 (Oct. 28, 2011).
95. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3522 n.15 (3d ed. 2012).
96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the district court to dismiss a case "at
any time" it determines it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, unlike other defenses,
which are waived if not promptly raised).
97. See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. 126 (1804).
98. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley (Mottley 1), 211 U.S.
149, 152 (1908) ("Neither party has questioned that jurisdiction, but it is the duty of
this court to see to it that the jurisdiction of the [federal trial court] ... is not
exceeded.").
99. The result of Mottley I, for example, was to force the parties to re-litigate in
state court what had already been decided in federal court, adding three years of
expense and delay. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley (Mottley 11), 219 U.S.
467, 472 (1911) (reaching the merits of the federal questions not decided in 1908).
100. In Capron, the Court allowed a plaintiff who originally claimed jurisdiction
but then lost at trial to later challenge the judgment against him for lack of
jurisdiction. 6 U.S. at 126-27. In Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), the Court
held that the wife and mother of passengers killed in an airplane accident had to
pursue her claims against the two defendants in two separate courts despite the risk
that the defendants would blame each other and secure inconsistent verdicts that
would leave her without any remedy. 490 U.S. at 545-46. Congress later reversed
Finley's result. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (authorizing pendent parties jurisdiction).
101. Wright and Miller stated:
A federal court's entertaining a case that is not within its subject matter
jurisdiction.., is nothing less than an unconstitutional usurpation of state
judicial power .... The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is too
fundamental a concern to be left to the whims and tactical concerns of the
litigants.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 3522.
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voluntarily submitting a dispute to international arbitration. 10 2
Rather, quite opposite to domestic considerations in the United
States, party consent is the sine qua non of ICSID jurisdiction. 10 3
Against this party-driven approach to ICSID jurisdiction,
Professor M. Sornarajah has applauded Salini's objective approach as
a means to restrict what he sees as the undue breadth of investment
in many newer BITs.l0 4 He has argued that the ICSID Convention
reflects "the traditional meaning of investment" at the time of its
drafting in 1964, which "did not go beyond... a long-term project for
the exploitation of resources or a project contract." 10 5 In his view, "the
definition of investment in the ICSID Convention remains
unaffected" by later BITs and "the use of the term 'investment' has a
temporal meaning varying from treaty to treaty depending on the
period in which it was drafted."' 0 6 ICSID, however, should not be
shackled to a 1960s conception of investment, which the drafters did
not write into the Convention. 0 7 The Convention gives life to an
institution and ought, to the extent consistent with good faith and
other rules of treaty interpretation, be construed to allow that
institution air to breathe and space to grow.' 0 8 Such dynamism is all
the more important given the nature of the Centre as a place devoted
to the peaceful settlement of disputes. By leaving investment
undefined, the Convention's drafters built flexibility into their
creation. Their emphasis on consent "as an essential characteristic of
102. Cf. Mortenson, supra note 57, at 306 (arguing that "close scrutiny" is not
needed where "[tlhe only entity hurt by deference ... is the entity to which deference is
actually directed: the [respondent] state itself').
103. See supra notes 51-56, 68-79. A potential exception to the otherwise firm
U.S. rule against consenting to federal jurisdiction is telling, because it allows party
consent in one circumstance where that consent cures the constitutional problem
driving the rule-namely, where a state itself consents to be sued in federal court.
According to Wright and Miller:
There may be an exception to this rule when a state has consented to be
sued in a federal court and has waived the protection afforded by the Eleventh
Amendment. Whether this situation actually involves an exception to the
general rule depends upon whether the Eleventh Amendment defense is one
going to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, an issue on which
there is substantial debate.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 95, § 3522.
104. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
10-18, 190-96, 310-13 (3d ed. 2010).
105. Id. at 310, 311.
106. Id. at 12 n.32.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5 and 57-67.
108. ICSID tribunals should heed, mutatis mutandis, Chief Justice Marshall's
exhortation that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). Neither the analogy nor the
interpretative liberality should be pushed too far. See JOSE E. ALVAREZ,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 65-74, 82-100 & n.138 (2005).
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the entire system of the Convention"'10 9 empowers member states
(within the limits of good faith) to adapt the institution to their needs,
as those needs may vary geographically and temporally. Bounded
deference thus better respects state autonomy and other values of the
international community. 110
Last, as readers will have noticed, this Article does not proffer its
own definition of investment, proposing instead an approach that
allows states to choose their own definitions within the confines of
good faith. Some commentators have suggested that this approach is
insufficient, contending that one must first define investment-or, at
least, outline its core parameters-before one can determine whether
another definition fits within an acceptable range of variance from
one's own baseline standard. Part III.B will explain why Salini's
contribution-to- development prong is inconsistent with the proper
role of an ICSID tribunal."' No more need be done here. In an actual
case, a tribunal may or may not find it necessary to lay more
groundwork to apply the good faith test to the facts before it. For
most definitions actually found in BITs, a tribunal may well be able
to conclude that the definition before it is reasonable without need to
belabor alternative definitions and parameters. The key lies in
embracing pluralism and deference. A spirit of pluralism-captured
in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's observation that "words are
flexible"'1 2-helps a tribunal avoid the mistake that investment has
one true meaning against which all others must be tested. Likewise, a
spirit of deference helps a tribunal see that states have the freedom to
choose among the possible definitions and the tribunal's role is
limited to determining the reasonableness, not the correctness, of a
state's choice.' 13
109. Broches, supra note 44, at 352.
110. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 77, at 11 ("The essential quality of statehood in a
state system is the autonomy of each state."); id. at 101 ("Commitment to state
autonomy has been shaken since the Second World War, but it is still a basic, perhaps
the basic, value of the system.").
111. See infra Part III.B.
112. Int'l Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926).
113. By way of analogy, when the U.S. Supreme Court established the deference
a U.S. court owes to administrative construction of an ambiguous statute, it observed
that the "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute" and "[t]he court need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the
construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially
had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843
& n.l (1984).
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III. ICSID, DEVELOPMENT, AND SALINtS DEVELOPMENT PRONG
A. Development as ICSID's Object and Purpose
Andreas Lowenfeld briefly captured the "[w]ave of
[e]xpropriations" that swept much of the globe in the first decades
after World War II:
[E]xpropriations and nationalizations of all kinds took place, in Eastern
Europe, in former colonies, and in newly invigorated countries of Latin
America. All the countries that had come under Communist
rule... nationalized land and private industrial property, including the
property of aliens. Utilities, mines, and other major enterprises were
subject to state takings in Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and
Guatemala, among other states of Latin America .... The most widely
known instances of state take-overs were the expropriation of Dutch
properties in Indonesia (1958-59), the nationalization of the Anglo-
Iranian. Oil Company's properties in Iran (1951), and Egypt's
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company (1956).114
In a series of debates through the 1960s into the 1970s, the UN
General Assembly struggled over the state of customary international
law on the property rights of aliens." 5 In 1964, in a case emerging
out of Cuba's nationalization of American-owned properties, the U.S.
Supreme Court observed:
There are few if any issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to
expropriate the property of aliens.... It is difficult to imagine the
courts of this country embarking on adjudication in an area which
touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the
various members of the community of nations. 
1 1 6
The World Bank would have known these events and
controversies, of course. Indeed, in 1956-1958, a World Bank team
helped to negotiate compensation for Egypt's nationalization of the
Suez Canal. A member of that team became president of the World
Bank in 1963.117
The purposes of the World Bank include "promot[ing] private
foreign investment."' 1 8 It can certainly be said that the World Bank
114. LOWENFELD, supra note 62, at 483-84.
115. See, e.g., id. at 486-94 (describing the UN debates).
116. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428--30 (1964).
117. LOWENFELD, supra note 62, at 484, 537 n.2; see also George David Woods,
THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/SY4JPEAC50 (last visited Sept. 28, 2012)
(describing Woods's presidency); Suez Canal Compensation Discussed, THE WORLD
BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/K48G1PWPAO (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (identifying
George Woods as one of the Bank's representatives in the Suez discussions);.
118. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, art. I(ii), July 22, 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter Articles of
Agreement]. The clause continues "by means of guarantees or participations in loans
[VOL. 45..1043
MICROINVESTMENT DISPUTES
conceived ICSID and sponsored the talks to create it for the purpose
of promoting investment. The Bank's executive directors asserted, for
example, that "the primary purpose of the [ICSID] Convention" was
to "stimulate a larger flow of private international investment." 119
This account, however, is incomplete. Investment promotion is
only ICSID's "intermediary purpose," not its "ultimate purpose. '120
Ultimately, the Bank initiated ICSID "to further [the Bank's own]
overall purpose of promoting economic development in the world's
poor countries. '121 The Bank's mission is even captured in its name:
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Its
statement of purposes makes clear that "facilitating the investment of
capital for productive purposes" is itself meant to serve the end of
"assist[ing] in the. .. development" of member states.122 Ibrahim
Shihata, a general counsel of the World Bank and secretary-general
of ICSID, thus wrote, "ICSID must be regarded as an instrument of
international policy for the promotion of investments and of economic
development."12 3 Support for this view of ICSID as an instrument of
and other investments made by private investors," id., although ICSID is an example
of the Bank not limiting itself to these means unless the arbitral process is seen as a
form of "guarantee." Broches described ICSID as being within the Bank's "institutional
ambit" though outside its "professional experience and competence," and thus
characterized it as a "semi-extra-curricular exercise." Broches, supra note 44, at 345,
347.
119. Executive Directors' Report, supra note 34, 12; accord Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes: Hearing on H.R. 15785 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Orgs. and Movements of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong. 2 (1966)
(statement of Fred Smith, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury) ("ICSID's]
primary purpose is to improve the climate for private investment in countries which
seek to attract foreign capital, particularly the economically developing countries, and
thus to stimulate a larger flow of private investment into those countries.").
120. Anne van Aaken & Tobias A. Lehmann, International Investment Law and
Sustainable Development: Developing a New Conceptual Framework 19 (Univ. of St.
Gallen Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2011-10,
2011), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1893692.
121. LOWENFELD, supra note 62, at 537. The Bank sought to make this
contribution through a procedural innovation without involving itself in the debates
about the state and desirability of the substantive international law of investment
protection. Elihu Lauterpacht, Foreword to SCHREUER, supra note 23, at ix. Even the
reference to international law in the Convention's choice of law clause is caveated with
the words "as may be applicable," ICSID Convention, supra note 3, art. 42(1), and this
reference "gives no clue as to the content of [international] law; evidently in 1964 no
useful clue could have achieved" widespread support. LOWENFELD, supra note 62, at
540.
122. Articles of Agreement, supra note 118, art. I(i); see also Broches, supra note
44, at 342 ("[A]s a development institution.., the Bank was and is vitally concerned
with capital flows from the developed to the developing countries.").
123. SHIHATA, supra note 46, at 314; see also Executive Directors' Report, supra
note 34, 9 ("In submitting the attached Convention to governments, the Executive
Directors are prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership between countries
in the cause of economic development."). Sornarajah has stressed that support among
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development can be found in the preamble to the ICSID Convention,
which is predicated on "the need for international cooperation for
economic development, and the role of private international
investment therein. 12 4
Alan Sykes likewise justified granting investors a direct right of
action on the ground that doing so generates economic benefits for
well-intentioned developing countries. In short, Sykes argued that
investors concerned about the risk of uncompensated expropriation
may charge a risk premium for investment in developing countries,
but a credible mechanism for assuring compensation ameliorates the
risk, thereby reducing the premium and the cost of capital for a
developing country.12 5 Espousal is too uncertain to reduce adequately
this premium; 126 depoliticization is intended to give investors more
confidence in the investment climate to stimulate investment flows to
further development. Sykes concluded that a state with "benign
intentions toward investors" can reap the benefits of cheaper capital
at minimal cost to itself by granting investors the right to initiate
investment arbitration and thus "signaling" to foreign investors that
it is a state of this "benign type.' 12 7
developing states for ICSID is contingent upon its nexus to development: "The very
essence of the system of investment protection ... is economic
development.... Subjection to... the ICSID system is achieved at the cost of a
surrender of sovereignty, and this is justified by the belief that economic development
will take place as a result." SORNARAJAH, supra note 104, at 313.
124. ICSID Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
125. Alan 0. Sykes, Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic
Law: Of Standing and Remedy 14-15 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ. Olin
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 235, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstractid=671801.
126. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, T 79 (Feb. 5) (stating that diplomatic protection is "a discretionary power the
exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature,
unrelated to the particular case"); Aron Broches, Note to the Executive Directors, in 2
HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 1, 61-192 2(b) (1968) ("The necessity of
espousal ... introduces a political element. An investor may well find that his national
Government refuses to espouse a meritorious case because it fears that to do so would
be regarded as an unfriendly act by the host Government.").
127. Sykes, supra note 125, at 15-16. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why
LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998) (arguing that developing countries sign BITs to
compete for capital against other developing countries by enhancing the credibility of
their commitments to foreign investors); Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital:
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265
(same). Some empirical support for Sykes's account may be found in Todd Allee & Clint
Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on
Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT'L ORG. 401 (2011) (arguing that foreign direct
investment (FDI) increases in non-OECD countries by $21-$24 million per year with
each BIT signed, but decreases by $55 million per year for each pending ICSID case
and by $791 million per year if the country has lost (or by $300-$350 million per year if
it has settled) an ICSID case within the past two years).
[VOL. 45:1043
MICROINVESTMENT DISPUTES
Investment promotion should thus be viewed as a means to the
end of economic development. Indeed, nearly fifty years after ICSID's
founding, one might venture that economic development is not
ICSID's ultimate purpose either. Rather, economic development
serves to improve human welfare, a true end.128 In other words, one
might drop the modifier "economic" in favor of a broader vision of
human development. 129 At the least, based on the intervening
decades of learning, one should acknowledge that economic
development does not occur in a vacuum, but in conjunction with the
development of legal and social institutions.13 0
B. Salini's Development Prong
Schreuer has identified five "typical characteristics" of
investments. 131 He included "significance for the host State's
development" in this list, for purposes of the ICSID Convention, while
acknowledging that "[t]his is not necessarily characteristic of
investments in general.' 1 32
Fedax v. Venezuela, the first ICSID decision centered on the
meaning of investment, relied on Schreuer's characteristics, calling
them the "basic features" of an investment. 133 Faced with the
question of whether promissory notes qualify as investment under
Article 25, the tribunal briefly ticked off how the notes possessed each
of the five features. 134 This recitation ended, "And most importantly,
there is clearly a significant relationship between the transaction and
the development of the host State .... ,,135
128. Cf. William Michael Reisman, International Law and Organization for a
New World Order: The Uppsala Model, General Report of JUS 1981, in THE SPIRIT OF
UPPSALA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT UNITAR-UPPSALA UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER 27, 40 (Atle Grah!-
Madsen & Jiri Toman eds., 1984) ("[Hluman rights, most broadly understood, have
been taken as the major goal and the major justification of world order.").
129. See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 134 (arguing that development should
include "development of human potential, political and social development and the
protection of the local and the global environment").
130. See van Aaken & Lehmann, supra note 120, at 7 ("There is no longer any
doubt that institutions are important for economic development as well as for
[sustainable development]."). See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAw-GROWTH
NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006).
131. See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 128. Four of Schreuer's characteristics
were adopted by Salini, while the last, expectation of profit, sometimes finds support
among Salini's progeny. See supra notes 8, 15 and accompanying text.
132. SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 128 (emphasis omitted).
133. See Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision
on Jurisdiction, T 43 (July 11, 1997).
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
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Two years later, in CSOB v. Slovakia, the tribunal considered
whether a loan constituted an investment under Article 25.136 The
tribunal laid primary emphasis on two factors: Slovakia's consent,
which "creates a strong presumption that [the parties] considered
their transaction to be an investment within the meaning of the
ICSID Convention";137 and CSOB's contribution to the development of
Slovakia's banking sector. On the latter, the tribunal reasoned that
the reference to promoting development in the ICSID Convention's
preamble supports a "liberal interpretation" of investment, stating:
"This language permits an inference that an international transaction
which contributes to cooperation designed to promote the economic
development of a Contracting State may be deemed to be an
investment as that term is understood in the Convention.' 138 The
tribunal then held that a loan may qualify as an investment "if only
because . . . [it] may contribute substantially to a State's economic
development.'13 9 Although the respondent had argued for an
approach to investment broadly similar to that advocated by Schreuer
and Fedax,140  the tribunal seems to have regarded CSOB's
contribution to Slovakia's development as sufficient alone to qualify
as an investment under Article 25.141
Accordingly, the first two cases to apply ICSID's development
objective to the construction of investment both approached the
question in a liberal spirit, treating contribution-to-development as a
factor easing access to ICSID arbitration. This began to change with
Salini, particularly in its more rigid manifestations as a "fixed and
inflexible" 142 checklist of mandatory criteria. With this, the
development language of the preamble transformed from a door-
opening aid into a door-closing obstacle for otherwise eligible
claimants.
The liberal approach is preferable. It respects member states'
autonomy, 143 maximizing their freedom to use ICSID as they deem
best. A fixed Salini test with a mandatory development prong sets
136. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic (CSOB), ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 76 (May 24, 1999), 14 ICSID Rev. 250,
276-77.
137. Id. at 274, 9 66.
138. Id. at 273, 9 64.
139. Id. at 276-77, T 76 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 277-78, $ 78.
141. See id. at 282-83, IT 90-91 (concluding that risk and expectation of return
are not required elements of investment and that "CSOB's claim and the related loan
facility ... qualify as investments" where they "are closely connected to the
development of CSOB's banking activity" in Slovakia).
142. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, 9 314 (Jul. 24, 2008).
143. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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Article 25's "outer limits" of ICSID jurisdiction more restrictively
than does the "ordinary meaning" of investment.144
In this regard, the mandatory development prong calls to mind
Alice's conversation with Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking
Glass:
Humpty: When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less.
Alice: The question is whether you can make words mean so many
different things.
Humpty: The question is which is to be the master-that's all.
Alice: That's a great deal to make one word mean.
Humpty: When I make a word do a lot of work like that, I always pay it
extra .... 145
Some tribunals must be paying investment extra. They make it do a
lot of work, making it mean just what they choose it to mean-not
investment in its ordinary sense but something less, something like
"investment that demonstrably contributes (substantially) to
development." The drafters of the ICSID Convention were free to
define investment as they wished, whether more or less expansively
than, or otherwise akilter from, its ordinary meaning. They did not do
so. Tribunals do not enjoy the drafters' freedom. Drafters are the
masters of language; tribunals are not. Tribunals are bound to
construe undefined terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning
and the customary rules of treaty interpretation. 146 In the context of
ICSID jurisdiction, absent clear limitations in Article 25, tribunals
should acknowledge that states are the masters of jurisdiction-that
the Convention empowers states with broad discretion to determine
in good faith which matters to submit to ICSID arbitration. 147
Tribunals should, accordingly, abandon Salini's development prong
144. See Vienna Convention, supra note 72, art. 31.1 (requiring that a treaty be
interpreted "in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning").
145. See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LoOKING-GLASS, reprinted in MARTIN
GARDNER, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 269-70 (1960). For brevity, I have edited Carroll's
text into dialogue form.
146. In this regard, one might note that, when construing the ICSID Convention
in its "context and in the light of its object and purpose," Vienna Convention, supra
note 72, art. 31.1, tribunals may appropriately limit investment to its economic sense-
lest any state try to submit to ICSID a dispute over priestly robes (in Shakespeare's
original usage), military blockades (in a usage attributed to the Duke of Wellington), or
material for dental coatings. See COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1991)
(investment definitions 1, 2b, 4, 5b).
147. See supra Part II.B.
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as an unwarranted restriction on state discretion even if they
otherwise persist with Salini's objective approach.148
Furthermore, if investment is to have an objective meaning in
Article 25, whatever that meaning might be, it must be the same
meaning for all ICSID members. If an investor must demonstrate
that its investment made a (substantial) contribution to development
in the host state as a condition. of ICSID jurisdiction, as the Salini
line would have it, this condition must apply wherever the
investment is made. But what does it mean to make a substantial
contribution to development in the United States or Japan? Is it even
possible to contribute to development in a country that is already
"developed"? At the very least, it is much more difficult for an
investor to prove that it made a substantial contribution to
development in a developed country than in a developing country.
The development prong therefore creates an imbalance of obligations
among ICSID members. Consider: If a German investor builds a
factory in Panama and a Panamanian investor builds a factory in
Germany-with identical contributions, durations, and assumptions
of risk-it is possible that Salini would lead ICSID tribunals to find
that only the former made a contribution to development, effectively
allowing Germany a jurisdictional out not available to Panama.
Other critiques of the mandatory development prong abound. For
example, although some proponents of the Salini test attribute credit
to Schreuer's "typical features" of investment, he has denied
paternity. 149 He has called "unfortunate" the trend toward
calcification of his "typical features" into a "rigid list of criteria,"
arguing that it will neither "facilitate the task of tribunals" nor "make
decisions more predictable.' 150 He has warned that a test insisting on
148. Two recent developments are instructive. In Fakes, the tribunal adopted a
three-prong version of Salini, accepting only those "three criteria [that] derive from the
ordinary meaning of the word 'investment."' The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries likewise built a three-prong variant of Salini into the
definition of investment in their new regional investment treaty. Notably, ASEAN and
Fakes both omitted Salini's development requirement-although, as it happens, they
did not agree on which three of Schreuer's other four characteristics to use. Compare
Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 110-12 & n.73 (July
14, 2010) (considering that "the criteria of (i) a contribution [of assets], (ii) a certain
duration, and (iii) an element of risk, are both necessary and sufficient"), with ASEAN
Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 4(c) & n.2, Feb. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/20632.htm ('The [required] characteristics of an investment
include the commitment of capital, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption
of risk."), and SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 128 (identifying five "typical characteristics
of investments under the Convention").
149. See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 133 ('The First Edition of this
Commentary cannot serve as authority for this development.").
150. Id.
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a showing of contribution to development needs "particular care."1 51
He has favored a liberal spirit in which an investor who contributes
to development "enjoys the presumption of being an investment," but
without automatically "exclud[ing] from the Convention's protection"
''an activity that does not obviously contribute to economic
development."' 52 And he has supported an expansive view of
development, which embraces "development of human potential,
political and social development and the protection of the local and
the global environment. 15 3
Some tribunals have rejected Salini's development prong. One
held that contribution to development is "implicitly covered" by any
investment, rendering a separate prong unnecessary. 154 Another
rejected the contention that the ICSID Convention's preamble
requires a development prong, holding that "economic
development.... is an expected consequence, not a separate
requirement, of the investment projects carried out by a number of
investors in the aggregate."'1 55
A third tribunal found it "impossible to ascertain" whether an
investment contributes to development, "the more so as there are
highly diverging views on what constitutes 'development. 1
5 6 It
proposed focusing on contribution to the economy, rather than to
development, and adopting the rebuttable presumption that
investments so contribute. 157 This approach is superior to Salini,
helpfully moving from the vague and value-laden question of whether
151. Id. at 134.
152. Id.
153. Id.; accord Casado v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB!98/2, Award,
234 (May 8, 2008) ("The acquisition and expansion of the daily El Clarin, whose
circulation was ... the country's largest, undoubtedly contributed to economic, social
and cultural development."); see also van Aaken & Lehmann, supra note 120, at 3
("[E]conomic growth alone is not enough. Rather, the economic, social, and
environmental aspects of any action are interconnected and have to be viewed
together.").
154. Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 102 &
n.65 (July 14, 2010) (quoting Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTAS v. People's
Democratic Republic of Alg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award, II.13(iv) (Jan. 10,
2005)).
155. Id. 111.
156. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award,
85 (Apr. 15, 2009). Brigitte Stern, the president of the Phoenix Action tribunal, later
elaborated on this comment, asking rhetorically: "[I]s the creation of a big department
store that lowers the prices for local consumers, but destroys the work of many small
shops, an investment that fosters development?" Brigitte Stern, The Contours of the
Notion of Protected Investment, 24 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 534, 543 (2009).
Stern concluded that arbitrators are ill-equipped to answer such questions, which must
instead be answered by states in formulating policies about the types of investments
they wish to protect under BITs. Id. at 543-44.
157. Phoenix Action, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 85-86.
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an investment aimed to "contribute to development" to the more
readily ascertainable question of whether it aimed to "contribute to
the economy." 158 It would be better still, however, to eliminate the
development prong than to recast it in a way that continues to limit
member state autonomy with an even weaker textual basis, while
collapsing the complexity of development into a single criterion.
IV. APPLICATION OF SALINfS DEVELOPMENT PRONG TO
MICROINVESTMENT DISPUTES
A. Surveying the Landscape of Microinvestment Disputes
Salini's impact on two recent microinvestment disputes-
Mitchell v. Congo and Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia-is
detailed below. 159 First, however, this section will survey briefly the
landscape of other (arguable) microinvestment disputes. 16 0
158. Compare the views of Devashish Krishan:
It is a stretch of human knowledge and reason to say that there must be an
individual showing of contribution to economic development for transactions to
be considered investments. Rather, [it should be assumed] that an economic
transaction constituting an investment, by definition, contributed to economic
development.... In order to reverse this assumption, one would need to adopt
a fantastical theory that investment is not a driver and causative instrument of
economic growth .... [I]t calls into question the competence of ICSID
arbitrators-most of whom are lawyers, not economists-to make this critical
determination.
Devashish Krishan, A Notion of ICSID Investment, 6 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT., 2009,
at 15-16. Krishan's last point finds support in the often quite thin reasoning of
tribunals applying the development prong. For example, a tribunal examining whether
improvements to a hotel constituted an investment had only this to say: "As for the
contribution to the development of the EGYPT's development [sic], the importance of
the tourism industry in the Egyptian economy makes it obvious." Helnan Int'l Hotels
A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05119, Decision on Objection to
Jurisdiction, 77 (Oct. 17, 2006). Apparently the tribunal deemed worthy any
contribution to the tourism sector because of Egypt's existing success in that sector.
Does this imply that contributions to less successful or even nonexistent sectors are
unworthy? Surely not, for development often entails starting or radically improving
industries to meet unmet needs. The reason given thus amounts to no reason at all.
159. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
160. In this section, I rely mainly on Susan Franck's data set, cited (gratefully)
with her permission. See Generation 1 Dataset and Related Materials, WASHINGTON &
LEE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http:/flaw.wlu.edu/faculty/page.asp?pageid=l185 (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012). Franck coded awards in investment treaty arbitrations for, inter alia,
the amount claimed, which is quite helpful for a survey of this nature. Nevertheless,
the data has several germane limitations: Franck did not code for the value of the
investment or the nature or size of the claimant, factors irrelevant to her research; she
focused on cases brought under investment treaties, not on investment claims pursuant
to contracts or statutes; only forty-four of the eighty-two cases (54 percent) in Franck's
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ICSID tribunals decided several microinvestment disputes before
Salini. In these cases, the size of the investment did not figure
prominently in the jurisdictional analysis. 161 Maffezini v. Kingdom of
Spain illustrates how adherence to a party-centric approach to Article
25 simplifies the jurisdictional analysis. 162 In that case, Spain raised
various jurisdictional objections. After noting that Maffezini's
contributions to the Spanish company qualified as investments under
the Argentina-Spain BIT, the tribunal commented simply, "These
provisions complement and are consistent with the requirements of
Article 25 of the Convention.' 163
Several microinvestment disputes have been brought to
investor-state arbitration outside ICSID.164 These cases are not
subject to Article 25, but this solution to the Salini problem is
imperfect at best and may vanish altogether. 165
data set "quantified an investor's claimed damages either fully or partially"; and the
data ends with awards published before June 1, 2006, quite long ago by ICSID
standards. Franck, supra note 24, at 17, 57.
161. See Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/9913, Award (Nov. 27, 2000),
5 ICSID Rep. 484, 489-90 (2002) (holding, in a dispute claiming about half the value of
an investment of $2.3 million, that jurisdiction was lacking because the claim fell
outside the scope of Malaysia's consent); Tradex Hellas, S.A. v. Republic of Alb., ICSID
Case No. ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 7 167, 178-80, 195 (Dec. 24, 1996), 5
ICSID Rep. 47 (2002) (holding, in a dispute arising from an investment valued at $2.2
million, that consent was not expressed validly in a BIT that had not yet entered into
force, but was found instead in Albania's investment statute).
162. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction, $ 65-70 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 296 (2002). Maffezini claimed
that, after he contributed 35 million pesetas, another 30 million pesetas were taken
from his account without authorization. He won the 30 million pesetas plus interest.
Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/9717, Award, 7 39-43, 94-97
(Nov. 9, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002). Maffezini's contributions totaled about
$600,000 and his claim was worth about $200,000 plus interest when filed in July
1997. See Historical Exchange Rates, OANDA-FOREX TRADING AND EXCHANGE RATES
SERVS., http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
163. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 68. For
other pre-Salini microinvestment disputes, see, e.g., Olguin v. Republic of Para., ICSID
Case No. ARB/98/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 8, 2000), 6 ICSID Rep. 156 (2004)
(involving a claim worth about $562,397, plus an adjustment for currency devaluation);
Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on Jurisdiction,
7 13, 25-36 (July 11, 1997) (involving promissory notes worth $598,950 in dispute).
164. See Bogdanov v. Moldova, Award, 7 5.1(ii), 5.2 (Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm
Chamber of Comm. 2005) (awarding 310,000 Moldovan lei, approximately $24,603 per
Franck's calculations, in principal damages, representing about half the value of the
"transferred assets" in dispute); Link-Trading Joint Stock Co. v. Moldova, Final Award,
9, (UNCITRAL 2002) (involving a claim worth about $3,458,813.25 in Moldovan lei).
ICSID was not available as a forum in these cases because Moldova did not become a
member state until 2011. See INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, LIST OF
CONTRACTING STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.orgICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
ContractingStates&ReqFrom=Main.
165. See infra note 252.
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Last, in Abaclat v. Argentina, ICSID addressed a "mass claims"
case that joined the claims of many microinvestors. 166 Argentine
government bonds had been sold widely to retail customers in Italy,
with the result that Argentina owed "$13.5 billion owned by Italian
[retail] bondholders (approximately 600,000 persons)."'1 67 After
Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt in 2001, more than 180,000
of these retail bondholders, including many individuals, joined
together in a single ICSID case.168 Most of the claimants qualified
individually as microinvestors, as the total debt amounted to only
about $22,500 per bondholder. Yet, the claimants' strategy of acting
together in a mass claims proceeding plainly distinguishes Abaclat
from a microinvestment dispute. Their strategy raises new questions
about ICSID's willingness and ability to decide mass claims. If
successful in Abaclat, mass collaboration may help some future
claimants manage certain difficulties that commonly trouble
microinvestors (such as the cost of arbitration relative to the amount
in dispute),169 but mass claims will remain radically distinct from
microinvestment disputes, and many microinvestors will continue to
find themselves without the option of collaborating with masses of
co-claimants.
B. Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo
Patrick Mitchell owned Mitchell & Associates, a small law firm
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo). On March 5, 1999,
Congolese authorities sealed the firm's premises, seized documents
and other items, and detained two attorneys. The premises remained
sealed and the attorneys remained imprisoned for more than eight
months. 170 With these actions, Congo effectively put Mitchell &
Associates out of business.' 7 '
166. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 7 294-98 (Aug. 4, 2011).
167. Id. 64.
168. Id. 7 1, 58. Withdrawals later reduced this number to sixty thousand
claimants. Id. 294, 640.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 238-45.
170. Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7,
Decision on Annulment, I I (Nov. 1, 2006) (quoting Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of
the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Award, 23 (Feb. 9, 2004)). The Mitchell award
has not been made public, so all references to it here rely on quotations found in the
annulment decision.
Luke Peterson has reported some further details about Mitchell's dispute with
Congo. Apparently, Mitchell & Associates represented a Canadian mining company,
Banro, in its own expropriation dispute with Congo. The Congolese authorities claimed
that Mitchell's firm was cooperating with rebels and charged the two detained
attorneys with treason. Among the items seized was "a large sum of cash." LUKE ERIC
PETERSON, RESEARCH NOTE: EMERGING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
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Mitchell, a U.S. citizen, brought an ICSID claim under the BIT
between the United States and Congo. The ICSID tribunal ruled that
"Mitchell has been the victim of an expropriation" in violation of the
BIT. It awarded him $750,000 plus interest. The tribunal also
ordered Congo to pay $95,000 as a contribution to Mitchell's share of
the tribunal's fees and costs. 172
Congo had objected to the tribunal's jurisdiction, arguing, inter
alia, that Mitchell had not made an investment within the meaning of
Article 25. The tribunal "received ample information" to determine
whether Mitchell's activities in Congo qualified as an investment.
173
The tribunal concluded that Mitchell
transferred into Congo money and other assets which constituted the
foundations for his professional activities .... Together with the returns
on the initial investments, which also qualify as investments .... these
activities and the economic value associated therewith qualify as an
investment within the meaning of the BIT and the ICSID
Convention. 174
The tribunal further considered that Mitchell's "movable property,"
his "right to 'know-how' and 'goodwill,"' and his "right to exercise [his]
activities" in Congo all qualified as investment. 175 The tribunal thus
laid emphasis on the bits and pieces of Mitchell & Associates without
adequate attention to the whole as a going concern. The fault is
shared with the BIT itself: its definition of investment omits an
express reference to any "enterprise," and although the tribunal could
have construed the definition's broad, exemplary language to include
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2003), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2003/investmentinvestsd note_2003.pdf; Luke Eric Peterson, ICSID Award Against
Democratic Republic of Congo Annulled, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Nov. 24, 2006,
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn-nov24 2006.pdf.
171. See Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment, 24
(quoting Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Award, 55).
172. Id. 5.
173. Id. 24 (quoting Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/9917, Award, 47).
174. Id. 24 (quoting Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/9917, Award, 55). The
tribunal's jurisdictional analysis drew a dissent from one arbitrator. See Mitchell v.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/9917, Decision on the Stay of
Enforcement of the Award, 7 12, 26 (Nov. 30, 2004), 20 ICSID Rev.-FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 587 (2005) (discussing the relevance of the dissent to Congo's request for a stay of
enforcement pending the decision on annulment).
175. Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment, 24 (quoting
Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/9917, Award, 48).
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an enterprise, 176 the United States has achieved greater clarity in
later treaties. 177
Congo also had argued that Mitchell's activities were not "a long-
term operation," did not involve a "significant contribution of
resources," and were "not of such importance for the State's economy
that it distinguishes itself from an ordinary commercial
transaction."178 The tribunal rejected these contentions, finding that,
while many investments possess these attributes, they are not
necessary to qualify as an investment. The tribunal declared that the
ICSID Convention "equally include[s] . . . 'smaller investments' of
shorter duration and with more limited benefit to the host State's
economy .... 179
Congo requested that an ad hoc committee annul the tribunal
award, contending that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers
and failed to provide reasons for its decision. Congo argued, inter alia,
that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Mitchell
had not made an investment within the meaning of Article 25. Congo
won. The ad hoc committee negated Mitchell's award and ordered him
to pay $100,000 as a contribution to Congo's share of the committee's
fees and costs. 180
The committee relied on the Salini test for its analysis. To avoid
the possibility that member states might sign an investment treaty
that "arbitrarily" defined business activities as investments, the
committee stressed that "the [ICSID] Convention has supremacy
over ... a BIT."'18 1 The committee staked out this position even
though it conceded that the relevant language in the US-Congo BIT
was "altogether usual and in no way exorbitant.' 1 82 It held that
Article 25 limits jurisdiction to investments with four interdependent
characteristics, including "contribution to the economic development
of the host country."'183 It regarded the development prong as
176. See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Dem. Rep. Congo, art. I(c), Aug. 3, 1984, available at
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/usdemo-rep-congo.pdf [hereinafter, U.S.-
Congo BIT] (defining investment).
177. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., art. 11.28, June 30, 2007,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-
fta/final-text (defining investment to include "an enterprise" and "shares, stock, and
other forms of equity participation in an enterprise"). The agreement in turn defines an
enterprise as "any entity constituted or organized under applicable law,... including
any corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association, or
similar organization." Id. art. 1.4.
178. Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment, 23.
179. Id. 24 (quoting Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Award, 56).
180. Id. 67.
181. Id. 31.
182. Id. 32.
183. Id. 27.
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"fundamental," "essential," and "unquestionable"-deeming it
"doubtless covered" implicitly by ICSID decisions where it "had not
been mentioned expressly. '18 4
The committee stated that the mandatory contribution to
economic development need not be "sizable or successful. . . . It
suffices for the operation to contribute in one way or another to the
economic development of the host State, and this concept of economic
development is, in any event, extremely broad but also variable
depending on the case. '18 5 Nevertheless, the committee was unable to
accept that Mitchell's small law firm made the kind of contribution to
development it deemed necessary. It declared that the firm was not
"readily recognizable" as an investment and was instead "a somewhat
uncommon operation from the standpoint of the concept of
investment,"1 8 6 noting this was the first ICSID case about a law
firm. 8 7 It considered irrelevant the "minimal" funds contributed by
Mitchell to start and operate his firm.18 8 Thus, while the committee
disclaimed any desire to discriminate against "smaller" investments,
its whole analysis began from the premise that the law firm was not
"readily recognizable" as an investment and that Mitchell's financial
contribution was "minimal."
The committee also excluded the firm's movable property, know-
how, and goodwill from its analysis, deciding these only mattered if
"the services of the 'Mitchell & Associates' firm ... constitute [an]
investment within the meaning of the Convention and the [BIT] .'189
The committee thus considered that the firm's services had to make a
contribution to development. 190 The committee added that this
requirement could only be satisfied if the firm "had concretely
assisted [Congo], for example by providing it with legal services in a
regular manner or by specifically bringing investors."'191
The committee concluded that the tribunal had made a
"particularly grave" error in failing to establish a link between the
firm's services and Congo's development, because the absence of such
a link 'boils down to granting the qualification as investor to any
184. Id. 30, 33.
185. Id. 33.
186. Id. 34, 39 (quoting Broches).
187. Id. 34. This argument is specious: ICSID cannot be expected to have
addressed every single industry, and for each industry that ICSID has addressed, one
case was the first to do so.
188. Id. 7 38.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id. 39.
191. Id. The committee conceded here that both parties had presented evidence
showing that "some U.S. investors had indeed consulted the 'Mitchell & Associates'
firm," but it disregarded this evidence because the tribunal had not mentioned it (at
least not with sufficient specificity). Id.
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law firm established in a foreign country.' 1 92 But the committee
failed to explain why every law firm should not qualify as an
investment. Contrary to the committee's view, law firms do indeed
share the characteristics typical of investment: they contribute assets
for an indefinite duration and bear risk in the expectation of profit.
They also hire and train employees, buy goods and services, pay taxes
and fees, and otherwise generate economic activity. What they lack is
physicality: the physical footprint is small, the equipment needed is
small, bricks and mortar are largely absent. Most of the value of a
law firm is invisible, lying in know-how and goodwill. This invisibility
probably explains why the committee deemed that Mitchell's law firm
was not "readily recognizable" as an investment. An investment in a
small law firm, to be sure, does not look like an investment in a
factory or power plant, but it is still an investment. The committee
seems to have been deceived by appearances.
Size also played an explicit role in the committee's reasoning, as
when it dismissed Mitchell's financial contribution as "minimal." This
was a mistake. The committee should have recognized that law is not
a capital-intensive industry. Small law firms may be started by
"hanging a shingle" on leased office space with some furniture and
basic office equipment. Even large law firms do not require overmuch
capital, especially when compared with services such as
telecommunications and transportation. This makes law firms small
investments, but still investments. While the committee worried
about drawing lines to avoid a rule allowing all law firms access to
ICSID, it neglected to consider the costs of a rule excluding many law
firms-and, apparently, also many accountants, architects,
consultants, doctors, engineers, and other knowledge-intensive
professional services. The committee's line-drawing led it to examine
the recipients of the services provided by Mitchell & Associates. The
committee should not have embarked on this path: a law firm's status
as an investment does not change depending whether the firm
counsels the government or private clients, domestic or foreign
clients, few or many clients, investors or other clients. Nor should the
committee have assumed that providing services to a government
necessarily makes a greater contribution than does providing services
to private persons. In the end, it is difficult to conceive that a larger
investment-whether more physically visible or more capitally
intense, which often go together, of course-would be subjected to the
same misguided analysis about the nature of its customers.
The committee's analysis, moreover, discounted the value of legal
know-how, disregarded the contributions that law firms make to
economic growth (by, for example, drafting contracts and obtaining
192. Id. 40.
1078 [VOL. 45.'1043
MICROINVESTMENT DISPUTES
permits),193 and ignored the possibility that law firms contribute to
the development of the rule of law, which both contributes to
economic growth 194 and ought to count inherently as a contribution to
development properly understood.195 This failure is particularly
notable here, as it has been reported that Congo moved against
Mitchell & Associates in retaliation for the firm's representation of a
foreign investor in a separate dispute with the government; if true,
this charge evidences the progress needed in Congo to develop the
rule of law for the benefit of investors, the Congolese economy, and
indeed Congolese society as a whole. 19 6 Due to its cramped view of
what contributes to development, the committee missed an
opportunity to hold Congo accountable to the values of the
international community.
C. Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia
In 1991, the government of Malaysia contracted with a marine
salvage company, Malaysian Historical Salvors (Salvors), to find and
salvage the cargo of a British ship that sank in the Strait of Malacca
in 1817.197 The contract (as described by the tribunal, a sole
arbitrator) required Salvors "to utilize its expertise, labour and
equipment to carry out the salvage operation, and to invest and
expend its own financial and other resources, and assume all risks of
the salvage operation. '198 Salvors "finance[d] the salvage operation in
its entirety."'199 Salvors acted on a "no finds-no pay" basis, under
which it bore "all the costs" and "attendant risks" of the operation. It
would "recover its expenditure and make a profit only if' it
successfully salvaged and auctioned the ship's cargo.
20 0
Salvors worked on this project for "almost four years," recovering
24,000 items. 20 1 Malaysia placed in its national museum some of the
193. See Peter Egger & Hannes Winner, Does Contract Risk Impede Foreign
Direct Investment?, 139 SwIss J. ECON. & STAT. 155, 156, 164 (2003) (arguing that the
viability of contracts correlates with FDI inflows, even when accounting for other
measures of the quality of legal institutions).
194. See, e.g., DAM, supra note 130, at 93-94 (discussing studies on the
correlation between confidence in the judiciary and economic growth).
195. Contributing to the rule of law fits comfortably within Schreuer's
conception of development, which encompasses "development of human potential" and
"political and social development." SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 134.
196. See Peterson, supra note 170.
197. Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 7 (May 17, 2007).
198. Id. 8.
199. Id. 9.
200. Id. 10.
201. Id. 13.
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salvaged goods. 20 2 The rest were auctioned in 1995, earning almost $3
million. The contract provided for Malaysia to pay Salvors 70 percent
of both the auction proceeds and "the best attainable value" for the
items Malaysia kept, which Salvors valued at over $400,000.203
Salvors claimed that Malaysia paid it only $1.2 million, leaving about
$1.2 million more in controversy. 20 4
In 2004, after some proceedings in other fora, Salvors filed an
ICSID case under the Malaysia-UK BIT.20 5 Malaysia objected to
jurisdiction on several grounds. The sheer number of jurisdictional
papers in this small case, filed over the course of fifteen months, is
striking: correspondence, memorials, post-hearing submissions, two
rounds of additional comments, and still more "gratuitous
submissions. '20 6 Salvors litigated at ICSID for nearly five years-
from filing its initial claim in May 2004 through an annulment
decision in April 2009-solely on jurisdiction.
Malaysia objected, inter alia, that the contract in dispute was
merely a "service contract," not an "investment contract. '20 7 Although
its first memorial on jurisdiction did not mention Salini, or otherwise
argue that Salvors failed to contribute to development, this came to
be the decisive issue in the case. 208 And Salvors's small size figured
prominently in the analysis.
The tribunal identified "seven decided cases of importance" on
the definition of investment in Article 25, in a line from Salini as "the
starting point" to Mitchell.20 9 Before discussing these cases, it first
202. Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Decision on Annulment, 4-5 (Apr. 16, 2009).
203. Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, IT 11-14.
204. Id. 1 13-14.
205. Id. 4 15-18. Salvors was incorporated in Malaysia. Id. 2. Oddly, the
tribunal never explained the basis of Salvors's claim to British nationality under the
BIT. The claim was presumably based on British ownership, something Malaysia
contended arose too late for jurisdictional purposes under the BIT, an issue the
tribunal did not decide. Id. 77 41.1, 148-49; Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn., Bhd. v.
Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Respondent's Memorial on Objections to
Jurisdiction, I 87-88, 107 (Mar. 11, 2006) (discussing the various intergovernmental
agreements that may have applied to the claimant). In a wonderful example of
transparency, the parties consented to ICSID publishing their jurisdictional
arguments. See Case Details: Pleadings, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=View
Pleadings (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
206. See Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 4 29-37,
50-52 (May 17, 2007) (detailing the filings made). All this does not even include the
claimant's preregistration correspondence with ICSID, the jurisdictional hearing in
Frankfurt, and the entire annulment proceeding.
207. Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Respondent's Memorial on Objections
to Jurisdiction, 108(c); accord Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on
Jurisdiction, 7 41.3.
208. Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 47, 66-68.
209. Id. 4 56, 74.
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explained why it found certain other cases "not... of significant
assistance ... in the present circumstances."210  Tellingly, the
tribunal distinguished one case that had held that a capital
contribution is an investment on the ground that the contribution in
that case involved "substantial amounts" of capital, when "the
Tribunal is not satisfied that the amount invested by [Salvors] could
be described as 'substantial amounts."'2 1 1
The tribunal reviewed the "seven decided cases of importance,"
"discern[ing] a broad trend which emerges from ICSID jurisprudence
on the 'investment' requirement. '2 12 In short, the tribunal applied the
four Salini criteria.2 13 Here again, size drove the analysis.
First, although Malaysia conceded that Salvors "made
contributions in money, in kind and in industry," the tribunal
nevertheless deemed it noteworthy that "the size of the contributions
were in no way comparable to those found in Salini" and other
cases.2 14 It repeatedly noted that Salvors's contribution was smaller
than the bank guarantee found not to be an investment in Joy Mining
v. Egypt.215
Second, concern for size manifested itself again in the tribunal's
analysis of the development prong, which had "considerable, even
decisive, importance. '2 16 The tribunal held that a contribution to
development does not suffice unless the contribution is
"significant. '2 17 "[T]he requirement of significance" is needed, the
tribunal warned, lest any contribution, "however small," qualify.218
Following Mitchell, the tribunal commented that the salvage contract
"is not a 'readily recognizable' 'investment.' 2 19 It accepted that
210. Id. 9 57.
211. Id. 63 (distinguishing Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Jamaica, ICSID
Case No. ARB/74/2).
212. Id. 9 56, 104.
213. Preferring a "Newtonian rather than a Cartesian approach (i.e. moving
from the particular to the general rather than vice versa)," id. 1 106, the tribunal never
quite articulated a clear test and reserved some flexibility in application, id. 106(e),
but its analysis tracked the four prongs of Salini, id. 9 107-46. The tribunal
considered a possible fifth prong accepted by some post-Salini tribunals (regularity of
profits), but concluded it was not apt in the particular circumstances of this case. Id.
108.
214. Id. 109.
215. Id. 109, 123, 134 n.19, 143 n.21.
216. Id. 123; see also id. 112, 130 (explaining the importance of
contribution to development for its analysis).
217. Id. 123.
218. Id.
219. Id. 1 126-30. The tribunal also followed Mitchell in deeming meaningful
the fact that Salvors was the first claimant in the marine salvage industry. Id.; see
supra note 187 (discussing Mitchell's point about the claimant being the first in its
industry).
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Salvors provided "gainful employment" to Malaysians, "cultural and
historical benefits" for Malaysia, and "direct financial benefits" to the
treasury through the auction proceeds-but it found these benefits
were not "material," were not of sufficient "quality or quantity," and
were ordinary benefits of a kind resulting from "any normal service
contract. '220 In the end, the tribunal appears to have concluded that a
"significant contribution" is only made where the investor produced a
"lasting" economic benefit for the host state, typically in the form of
"infrastructure. 221
Finally, the tribunal exported its development conclusion into its
analysis of the duration of Salvors's activities in Malaysia. It noted
that Salini had discussed a minimum time of two to five years, which
Salvors's four-year effort satisfied "in a quantitative sense," but only
because of the "fortuity" that Salvors was unable to find and salvage
the wreck in eighteen months as originally contemplated.2 22 Then, it
held that duration also has a "qualitative sense," which is tied to
contribution to development, so a claimant failing the development
prong fails the duration prong as well. 223
Despite all this emphasis on size, the tribunal disclaimed that
size was determinative: "It should not be thought that investments of
relatively small cash sums can never amount to an 'investment.' 224
However, the next sentence suggested that all this means is that
some large investments take forms other than cash (e.g., intellectual
property). 225 It is difficult to conceive of any small investment capable
of satisfying the tribunal's test of a lasting, significant contribution to
infrastructure.
The tribunal accordingly dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. This decision rested solely on the meaning of investment
in Article 25, as the tribunal declined to decide any other issue,
including whether Salvors had made an investment under the
definition in the BIT.2 26
Salvors requested annulment of the award. It won. The ad hoc
committee, split two to one, annulled the award on the ground that
the tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to exercise
its properly invoked jurisdiction. 22 7 The committee faulted the
220. Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 7 131-32,
144.
221. See id. 7 143-44 ("The benefit [of Salvors's project] was not lasting, in the
sense envisaged in the public infrastructure or banking infrastructure projects.").
222. Id. 1 110.
223. Id. 77 110-11.
224. Id. 7 139.
225. Id.
226. Id. 77 146-49.
227. Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 80 (Apr. 16, 2009).
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tribunal for "exclud[ing] small contributions" from ICSID's ambit and
adopting a construction at odds with "the decision of the drafters of
the ICSID Convention to reject a monetary floor in the amount of an
investment. '228 Evidencing its commitment to ICSID access for small
claims, the committee ordered Malaysia to bear the full costs of the
annulment procedure (but not Salvors's attorney fees), declaring:
[Ilt was not the intent of the drafters of the ICSID Convention to
exclude claimants advancing claims of minor financial dimension. If
such claimants are left to pay not only the costs of their legal
representation but half of the ICSID costs as well, the practical result
could be to discourage if not debar small claims.2 2 9
A few words of elaboration about the committee's analysis are
needed. The committee considered that the ordinary meaning of
investment is "the commitment of money or other assets for the
purpose of providing a return" and found no reason to deviate from
that meaning in Article 25.230 The committee emphasized the
definition in the BIT, apparently accepting the view that member
states have unbridled freedom to define investment as they wish
when consenting to ICSID jurisdiction. 231 Given the importance of the
228. Id. 80(b)-(c).
229. Id. 82.
230. Id. 57. Among the reasons I believe that member-state discretion must be
bounded by good faith is the statement in the Executive Directors' Report that
jurisdiction is limited by the "nature of the dispute." See Executive Directors' Report,
supra note 34, 25. The committee appears to have conceded that this language places
one restriction on member-state discretion: 'investment' does not mean 'sale."' Salvors,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 72.
231. The committee argued:
It cannot be accepted that the Governments of Malaysia and the United
Kingdom concluded a treaty providing for arbitration of disputes arising under
it in respect of investments so comprehensively described, with the intention
that the only arbitral recourse provided.., could be rendered nugatory by a
restrictive definition of a deliberately undefined term of the ICSID
Convention ....
... [T]reaties... today are the engine of ICSID's effective jurisdiction. To
ignore or depreciate the importance of the jurisdiction they bestow upon ICSID,
and rather to embroider upon questionable interpretations of the term
"investment" as found in Article 25(1) of the Convention, risks crippling the
institution.
Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 62,
73. The interpretative significance given here to the wave of investment treaties may
be seen as a procedural extension of the views of the committee's president, Judge
Schwebel, about the import of those treaties in generating substantive customary law
on the treatment of investments. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral
Investment Treaties on Customary International Law, 98 PROC. AM. SOCY INT'L L. 27
(2004) (arguing that BITs have reshaped custom on protection of foreign investment).
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BIT to the committee's analysis, it found that the tribunal had
committed a "gross error" by failing to consider and apply the BIT's
definition of investment.2 32 Finally, where the tribunal (like in
Mitchell Annulment) seems to have been driven by a quest for line-
drawing to limit access to ICSID, the committee tilted the other way:
it favored access to ICSID for all investments, however defined in the
BIT, regardless of size, and particularly where ICSID is the only
forum specified in the BIT.233
The dissent made an impassioned case for requiring a
contribution to development as a jurisdictional condition. In the
dissent's view, this requirement is what "separate[s] an ICSID
investment from any other kind of investment" and "ICSID
arbitration... from any other kind of arbitration."2 3 4 The dissent
further insisted that the contribution to development must be
significant, contending that in the absence of an express textual
command to include "minor but negligible matters" within the scope
of investment, basic principles of international law mandate the
requirement of significance.2 35 Without this requirement, the dissent
warned, ICSID would protect even "an entity which is systematically
earning its wealth at the expense of the development of the host
State."23 6 Accordingly, the dissent proclaimed, "ICSID would seem to
have lost its way: it is time to call back the organization to its original
mission. "237
V. A MICROINVESTMENT CRITIQUE
As illustrated by the opinions in Mitchell Annulment and Salvors
Award, one risk posed by Salini's contribution-to-development test-
232. Salvors, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for
Annulment, T 74.
233. See, e.g., id. 7 62, 82 (expressing concern for assuring "international
recourse" for small investors and reducing Salvors's share of the costs to facilitate such
recourse).
234. Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, T 30 (Feb. 19,
2009). The dissent used the phrase "an ICSID investment" twenty-eight times, id.
passim, apparently to emphasize the point that investment in Article 25 can and does
mean something narrower than the ordinary meaning of the word in other contexts.
See, e.g., id. 32 ("[Ain ICSID investment [i]s a special kind of investment."). The
dissent appears to have contrasted "an ICSID investment" with "purely commercial
enterprises," contending that the former "might indeed be made in favour of private
entities but not for their own enrichment exclusively .... Id. 7 17, 22.
235. See id. 7 34-36 (mentioning de minimis, good faith, ex re sed non ex
nomine, proportionality, and abuse of rights).
236. Id. 22.
237. Id.
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especially in its "substantial contribution" variant-is that it may
devolve into a backdoor mechanism for screening out
microinvestments. The Convention does not impose a minimum size
requirement, and tribunals ought not invent one. As the Fakes v.
Republic of Turkey tribunal stated, "[S]mall investments are covered
by the ICSID Convention in the same way as large investments. An
investment can be large or small .... ,,238
In a worst-case scenario, a ruling that a microinvestment is not
an investment under Article 25 can deprive the claimant of any
international forum to hear the claim. For example, had the Salvors
Award not been annulled, the claimant would have been left without
another forum because the Malaysia-UK BIT makes ICSID the sole
forum for dispute settlement,23 9 as do a number of other BITs.
2 40
238. Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 112 n.73
(July 14, 2010).
239. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Malay.-
U.K., art. 7, May 21, 1981, U.K.T.S. No. 16 (1989).
By contrast, the BIT at issue in Mitchell afforded an alternative known as the ICSID
Additional Facility. See U.S.-Congo BIT, supra note 176, art. VII(2)(b). The Additional
Facility may decide 'legal disputes which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre
because they do not arise directly out of an investment." INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INv. DISPUTES, ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, art. 2(b) (2006), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFREnglish-final.pdf. However,
access to the Additional Facility is conditioned on receiving the secretary-general's
approval, which she can give "only if [s]he is satisfied.., that the underlying transaction
has features which distinguish it from an ordinary commercial transaction." Id. art.
4(3)(b). Moreover, Additional Facility arbitration is "outside the jurisdiction of the
Centre," so "none of the provisions of the Convention" apply, including the Convention's
special provisions on enforceability of awards. Id. art. 3; see also SCHREUER, supra note
23, at 27, 141-43, 1120-23 (discussing the Additional Facility); sources cited supra
note 40 (discussing enforcement).
Where no international forum is available, domestic court litigation may be an
option, but courts may not enforce treaty rights, may be bound by domestic rules (such
as the later-in-time rule in the United States) that restrict treaty-based challenges to
domestic legislation, may otherwise defer to domestic actions, and may even
themselves deny justice to foreign litigants. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 141-48, 198-211 (Oxford Univ. Press,
2d ed. 1996) (1990) (discussing various limitations on the enforcement of treaties by
U.S. courts); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005). In any
of these scenarios, a foreign investor may find itself forced to exhaust remedies in the
national courts and then attempt to persuade its home state to espouse its claim-
exactly the antiquated process ICSID is meant to replace.
240. Although I am not aware of any statistics on point, the following examples
suffice to show that the Malaysia-UK BIT is not alone among BITs in designating
ICSID as the sole forum for dispute settlement: Albania-UK, Gambia-Netherlands,
Germany-Swaziland, Guyana-UK, Netherlands-Yemen, and U.S.-Morocco.
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Gam.-Neth.,
art. 9, Sept. 25, 2002, 67 (2002) NR. 1; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Alb.-U.K., art. 8, Mar. 30, 1994, U.K.T.S. No. 17 (1996); Treaty
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Swaz.,
art. 11(2), Apr. 5, 1990, BGBL. II at 957; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
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Even with the annulment in Salvors, it should be seen that the
development prong imposed costs, risks, and delay on the claimant.
These burdens are much plainer, of course, in Mitchell, where the ad
hoc committee annulled the claimant's award and went so far as to
order him to pay Congo $100,000.241 Burdens like this may dissuade
microinvestors from filing meritorious claims2 4 2 because they are
inherently challenged to afford investment arbitration, and each
incremental cost further tilts the field against them. 243 These
of Investments, Guy.-U.K., art. 8(1), Oct. 27, 1989, U.K.T.S. No. 47 (1990); Treaty
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-
Morocco, art. VI(3), July 22, 1985, 1985 U.S.T. 222; Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Yemen, art. 9, Mar. 18, 1985, 9 (1985) NR.
1. Likewise, in SGS Socidt6 Gknbrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 151 (Aug. 6, 2003), 18 ICSID
Rev. 307, the tribunal noted, "It is important in this connection to observe that Article
9(2) of the [Swiss-Pakistan] BIT provides only one recourse to an investor, that is,
recourse to a tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention." In the 1990s, the
French Model BIT (Article 8) provided for ICSID only; the British and German Model
BITs (Articles 8 and 11, respectively) preferred ICSID only, while including alternative
language that allowed investors other choices as well; and the Chilean and Portuguese
Model BITs (Articles 8 and 9, respectively) provided for only ICSID or local courts. See
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-
1990S, Annex 11 (1998) (collecting Model BITs). The newer BITs I have seen tend to
provide arbitral options other than ICSID, but this does not change the fact that the
ICSID-only BITs remain in effect (and are likely to do so for the foreseeable future).
241. Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7,
Decision on Annulment, 67 (Nov. 1, 2006).
242. Even in a NAFTA case where a majority of the tribunal ordered the
unsuccessful claimant to pay 75 percent of both tribunal costs and Mexico's attorney
fees, the tribunal acknowledged that its "loser pays" approach ought not apply "in the
case of an investor with limited financial resources where considerations of access to
justice may play a role." Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States,
Arbitral Award, 214, 220-21 (UNCITRAL 2006). Thomas Walde dissented from the
order of costs, stressing that it "makes recourse to independent justice for smaller
companies prohibitive." Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States,
Separate Opinion of Thomas Wiilde, 142 (UNCITRAL 2005). Compare, in the
different context of the "American rule" disfavoring the shifting of attorney fees in U.S.
civil litigation, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967) ("[S]ince litigation is at best uncertain, one should not be penalized for merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and... the poor might be unjustly discouraged
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the
fees of their opponents' counsel.").
In this regard, Stephan Schill has argued that tribunals in investment arbitration
generally should (and generally do) engage in one-way cost-shifting in favor of
successful claimants, but not against unsuccessful claimants, in order to adequately
incentivize the prosecution of claims. Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective
Compliance, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 653, 655 (2006). Microinvestors present
a compelling instance for Schill's thesis: having lost their business, they are especially
vulnerable to the additional risk of adverse cost-shifting and they may need the
prospect of favorable cost-shifting to afford to pursue a winning claim.
243. Susan Franck has mined her data set for information about the costs of
arbitral tribunals and attorney fees in investment treaty arbitration. See Franck, supra
note 24, at 69 (considering a total of 102 awards). She found eleven awards where
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burdens also pressure microinvestors to settle on unfavorable
terms.244 The development prong presses a finger on the scale against
access to the ICSID system, and it weighs particularly heavily
against claims by microinvestors-indeed, it may not carry any force
at all in cases regarding larger investments, 245 given the conclusory
assertions and weak analyses often found in such cases.246
tribunals quantified cost-shifting of attorney fees, with an average of $655,407 shifted.
Id. She also found seventeen awards quantifying tribunal costs, with an average of
$581,333. Id. These prices are obviously problematic for microinvestment disputes.
In another article, Franck surveyed the literature about the cost of investment
arbitration. See Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 811-13 (2011). She concluded that the costs are "not
necessarily exorbitant," but "may prove troubling" nonetheless:
[W]here attorney's fees and tribunal costs exceed the possible damages (i.e., for
smaller investments), those fiscal costs may deter investors with legitimate
claims of international law violations from arbitrating their claims .... [C]ost
decisions can be critical to assessing the utility of arbitration and its efficacy in
promoting access to justice and the rule of law.
Id. at 812-13. Others have made similar observations:
There is growing-albeit largely anecdotal--evidence that ... the high
costs of arbitration and the exclusivity of legal expertise in the field prevent
SMEs from accessing investor-state arbitration as readily as do larger
enterprises.... With less of a financial cushion, SMEs confronted with an
investment dispute are arguably less able to bear the costs of investor-
arbitration.
Lee M. Caplan, Making Investor-State Arbitration More Accessible to Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 297, 298, 304
(Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009); see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a
Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes-A Preliminary Sketch,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POLz 7, 8-12 (2005) (discussing remarks by the CEO of
Metalclad about the difficulties and expense of investment arbitration, including $4
million in fees, notwithstanding that Metalclad won an award of almost $17 million);
Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration-Corporate Attitudes and Practices-12
Perceptions Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
525, 584 (2004) (concluding "international [commercial] arbitration is at least as
expensive as litigation for middle and smaller sized cases").
244. Franck revealed that settlement rates are quite low (7 percent) in her data
set. Franck, supra note 24, at 74. Based on my own experiences in and observations of
disputes, I would join Franck's hypothesis that the rates are so low because the novelty
of the field introduces many uncertainties that inhibit claimants and respondents from
coming to a shared understanding about the appropriate value, and thus would predict
that-if the jurisprudence of investor-state arbitration stabilizes as it grows-
settlements should become more prevalent. This prediction is consistent with Franck's
observation that all three cases in her data set that resulted in an award confirming a
settlement first had "a critical decision by the arbitral tribunal' that removed
important elements of uncertainty from these disputes. Id. at 72.
245. Cf. Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 119-21 (May 17, 2007) (noting that, "[iln this
Tribunal's view, the main reason why the PSEG tribunal did not discuss the Salini
10872012]
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The development prong may hinder access to ICSID arbitration
in another way as well. While trends in investor-state arbitration
appear to favor contingency-fee arrangements or third-party
funding,24 7 these arrangements may be inhibited by the increased
risk of jurisdictional defeat 248 and the greater costs that must be
incurred to minimize that risk.249 This concern ought not be
overstated, however, as microinvestor claimants inherently face
significant obstacles to obtaining financial support because their
expected recovery is limited.250
criteria was because the investment in question was a 'readily recognizable
investment,"' where claimant had an $800 million contract to build a power plant).
246. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 158 (discussing Helnan).
247. For claims by knowledgeable insiders about this trend, see, for example,
Mark Kantor, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: An Essay About New
Developments, 24 ICSID REV. 65, 76 (2009) ("Notwithstanding the legal uncertainties
created by the differing cultural and legal reactions to third-party funding among
countries, the practice is flourishing."). For anecdotal evidence of this trend, see S&T
Oil Equip. & Mach., Ltd. v. Juridica Inv. Ltd., 456 F. App'x 481, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2012)
(affirming lower court's refusal to stop a contractual arbitration in Guernsey between a
U.S. company that had abandoned an ICSID claim against Romania and its third-party
funder); RSM Prod. Corp. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Order Discontinuing
the Proceeding and Decision on Costs, 68-69 (Apr. 28, 2011) (ordering RSM to pay
Grenada's legal fees when RSM abandoned its claim, notwithstanding RSM's
allegations that Grenada's legal fees were paid by a third-party funder); ICSID
LAWYERS, www.icsidlawyers.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) ("If we determine your
[investment arbitration] claim is meritorious, various legal fee payment types are
possible, including contingency fee agreement (where we find funding on your behalf to
advance your claim).").
248. By way of comparison, no less an observer of U.S. civil litigation than
Arthur Miller has predicted that recent decisions heightening the standards to
commence litigation in the federal courts will cause lawyers to take fewer cases on a
contingency fee basis, making it harder for plaintiffs to find representation and thus
leaving more meritorious claims uncompensated. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J.
1, 66-68 (2010).
249. Continuing with the analogy to U.S. pleadings standards, one survey of
approximately two hundred employment lawyers who had filed a federal complaint
since the standards began to change in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), found that 94 percent alleged more facts in their complaints and 75 percent had
to respond to motions to dismiss more often. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
5, 11-12 (2010), available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv2,pdf/$flle/costciv2.pdf.
250. One third-party funder, which is known to have funded at least one ICSID
case, announced that it "focuses exclusively on [cases] where the amount in dispute
exceeds US$25,000,000." About Juridica: Investment Policy, JURIDICA INV. LTD.,
http://www.juridicainvestments.comlabout-juridica/in'estment-policy.aspx (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012). The cost of due diligence in deciding which cases to fund may make
investments in small cases cost-prohibitive. See Anthony Charlton, Kicking (All) the
Tyres, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2010/12/02fkicking-all-the-tyres/ ("From anecdotal evidence, funders will, on
average, depending on the size of the claim, invest anywhere between US$100,000 to
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Salini's development prong may push some microinvestment
claims outside ICSID into other arbitral fora, depriving
microinvestors of a choice available to larger claimants. From a
claimant's perspective, alternative tribunals may be inferior to
ICSID, especially when it comes to the enforceability of awards 251-
and a recent case outside ICSID suggests the possibility that a Salini-
like analysis may close access to other tribunals as well. 252 Moreover,
US$1 million on due diligence, covering both legal and quantum issues."). Likewise, a
survey of U.S. civil litigators found that "[a]lmost 90% of plaintiffs' lawyers" in the
survey, 74 percent of whom rely on contingency fees as their "usual arrangement" with
clients, "agree that their firm, in general, will turn down a case if it is not cost-effective
to handle it"; this figure was significantly higher than the comparable number for
defense counsel (76 percent), who almost never use contingency fees as their usual
arrangement (0.1 percent). ABA SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL
PRACTICE: FULL REPORT 172-76 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.orgflitigationl
survey/1209-report.html.
251. See supra text accompanying note 40 (comparing enforceability provisions
of the New York and ICSID Conventions). It is possible that the greater automaticity of
ICSID awards, which a textual comparison of the two Conventions suggests, may prove
less meaningful in actual practice. See Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of
ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 1 (2006) (arguing that enforcement of ICSID awards is
less automatic than often believed); Gaetan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement
Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not To ICSID, 23 ICSID REV, 119, 146-47
(2008) (concluding that enforcement of ICSID awards is "undeniably pretty good,"
while enforcement of non-ICSID awards is "not so bad at all"). In my view, it is too soon
to reach an empirical conclusion on the comparative enforceability of investment
arbitration awards, especially as enforceability is presently confronting its greatest test
yet. See, e.g., Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(vacating a non-ICSID award because claimant had not litigated in Argentine courts
for eighteen months before commencing arbitration, as specified in the Argentina-UK
BIT); Proclamation No. 8788, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,899, 2 (Mar. 26, 2012) (imposing trade
sanctions because Argentina "has not acted in good faith in enforcing [ICSID] arbitral
awards in favor of United States citizens").
252. Romak, a Swiss company, brought a BIT claim against Uzbekistan seeking
payment of a commercial arbitral award arising out of an unpaid sale of wheat. Romak
S.A. v. Republic of Uzb., Case No. AA280, Award, 7, 13 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009).
Uzbekistan objected to the tribunal's jurisdiction, arguing that Romak had not made
an investment in Uzbekistan. Id. 7 97. The BIT defined investments to "include every
kind of assets," followed by an exemplary list that included "claims to money." Id.
Romak advocated a literal construction of this definition, arguing that its rights to
payment under the wheat contract and the arbitral award qualified as investments
under the BIT. Id. 101. The tribunal rejected this argument, reasoning that the BIT
allowed investors to choose ICSID, that the language granting that choice would be
rendered useless if investment in the BIT were given a wider scope than ICSID
permits, and that investment in the BIT should be given the same construction,
regardless whether claimant chose ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration. Id. 192-95.
After discussing Salini and its progeny, id. 7 196-205, the tribunal decided that the
word investments in the BIT has "an inherent meaning" or "plain meaning" that
corresponds with the first three prongs of Salini. Id. 207-08. The tribunal was
"further comforted ... by the reasoning adopted by other arbitral tribunals," including
Salini. Id. 207. The tribunal then applied its three-part definition of investments,
concluding that Romak did not satisfy any of the three parts. .d. 77 209-43. The
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from a public perspective, proceedings before alternative tribunals
are generally less transparent than ICSID and less open to public
participation as amici.25
3
Inhibiting microinvestors' access to ICSID is particularly
unfortunate because they may have the most need for treaty-based
protection.25 4 While large businesses sometimes enjoy sufficient
leverage to secure contractual commitments to international
arbitration,2 55 small businesses are typically less able to protect
themselves politically in the host state or to secure diplomatic
protection from their home state. 256 And small businesses are more
affected by weaknesses in legal systems,2 57 especially in countries
tribunal did not address Salini's development prong, although the parties had disputed
whether Romak satisfied it. Id. 105(iv), 108(iv). Although I agree with the tribunal's
implicit position that a contribution to development is not part of the "inherent
meaning" of investment, the tribunal thereby left a gap between its approach and that
of Salini, thus undercutting its position that investment should be given the same
construction regardless of forum. See supra text accompanying notes 145-48 (arguing
that Salini's development prong is not consistent with the ordinary meaning of
investment). Sornarajah apparently would close that gap by reading an "inherent
limitation" into all BITs, "confin[ing]" their protection to "investments that promote
economic development." SORNARAJAH, supra note 104, at 314.
253. See ICSID R. P. FOR ARB. PROCEEDINGS 32(2), 37(2), 48(4) (addressing
public access to hearings, amicus briefs, and publication of summaries of awards);
SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 697-707 (discussing confidentiality and transparency).
NAFTA cases outside ICSID have been a notable exception, as the NAFTA parties have
been important proponents of transparency in investment arbitration. See NAFTA Free
Trade Comm'n, Statement of Interpretation, pt. A (July 31, 2001) (addressing public
access to documents about NAFTA arbitration); NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n,
Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation, 44 I.L.M. 796 (2005) (addressing
amicus participation in NAFTA arbitration).
254. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 34 (2009), available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/
diaeia20095_en.pdf ("BITs may matter as a special protection for small and medium-
sized enterprises .. "); id. at 52 ('There is anecdotal evidence from a number of home
countries that SMEs are particularly interested in BITs.").
255. See Broches, supra note 44, at 344.
256. As Caplan wrote:
While larger enterprises sometimes pursue arbitration, they may feel, as a
general matter, that it is less necessary or even desirous to do so. Their
stronger economic and political influence may bring host state governments to
the negotiating table more readily and with better settlement
terms.... Because larger enterprises are typically more financially resilient
than SMEs, they are likely to be in a better position to pursue a broader
dispute settlement strategy that is less reliant on investor-state arbitration.
Caplan, supra note 243, at 302; see also id. at 301 n.20 ("The small or medium investor
would rarely carry the weight to cause the scales to tip in its favor." (quoting Nigel
Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 TRANSNAT'L DISP.
MGMT., 2004)).
257. An economic analysis of "over 4,000 firms in 54 countries" concluded:
[VOL. 45'1043
MICROINVESTMENT DISPUTES
with comparatively weak legal systems. 258 ICSID ought not adopt a
jurisdictional requirement that impedes access for the very claimants
most in need of effective, neutral dispute settlement. Such
impediments effectively hang an "unwelcome" sign on ICSID's door,
which may in turn diminish support for investment arbitration
among small enterprises, an essential business constituency.
259
Depriving microinvestments of adequate access is also
inconsistent with ICSID's foundational syllogism: the availability of
effective, neutral tribunals promotes investment flows and, therefore,
promotes development. 260  While the costs of losing any one
microinvestment are small (by definition), what is vital from the
developmental perspective is the cumulative impact of many
microinvestments. 261 Collectively, the economic power of smaller
enterprises is awesome: "[E]stablishments that employ less than 100
people have the largest employment shares, ranging from 40% in
upper-middle income countries to 57.6% in low income countries."
262
[The predicted effect of the summary legal obstacle on annual firm growth is
2.8% for large firms, whereas it is 5.7% for medium firms and 8.5% for small
firms.... These results indicate that large firms are able to adjust to the
inefficiencies of the legal system. However, the same does not seem to be the
case for small and medium enterprises, which end up paying for the legal
systems' shortcomings in terms of slower growth.
Thorsten Beck et al., Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size
Matter?, 60 J. FIN. 137, 137, 161 (2005).
258. The same analysis also observed:
The results indicate that firms in financially and legally developed countries
with lower levels of corruption are less affected by firm-level
obstacles .... Taking into account firm size reinforces the
results .... [M]arginal improvements in legal efficiency translate into a
relaxing of legal constraints for small and medium-sized firms (albeit
significant at the 10% level).
Id. at 162-66.
259. I thank Luke Nottage for this observation.
260. To similar effect, Thomas Wilde dissented from Thunderbirds order of
costs against an unsuccessful claimant on the ground that raising barriers to
arbitration for smaller companies "undermines the very purpose of [investment]
treaties" by "leaving out entrepreneurs with initiative, willingness to take.., risk."
Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion of
Thomas Wdlde, 142 (UNCITRAL 2005); see also id. 5, 86, 140 (stressing the
importance of making investment arbitration accessible to smaller, entrepreneurial
investors).
261. See Caplan, supra note 243, at 298 ("Though SMEs typically make small
investments on an individual basis, their collective efforts can be sizeable, with
substantial benefits for international development and cross-border prosperity.").
262. Meghana Ayyagari et al., Small vs. Young Firms Across the World:
Contribution to Employment, Job Creation, and Growth 12 (World Bank Dev. Research
Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 5631, 2011), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.orglservlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/04/11/000158349-20110
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It has also been shown that smaller businesses transfer more
technology to developing countries than do larger businesses.
63
Governments can sometimes entice large investments
individually by negotiating one-off deals, but this cannot be done for
microinvestments. To encourage microinvestments, governments
must instead craft good rules and institutions to attract them en
masse. SMEs brim with untapped potential for more foreign direct
investment (FDI).264
Thus, in the name of promoting development, the Salini test may
actually hamper that goal. To be sure, the word "may" in the previous
sentence (and elsewhere in this section) indicates an important limit
on the claim made in this critique. The argument is essentially
theoretical, relying on the theories underpinning ICSID's
foundational syllogism and the idea that raising costs and risks for
microinvestors will affect their actions on the margins.2 65 Lee Caplan
411130747/RenderedPDFWPS5631.pdf. Also striking is the percentage of new jobs
created by small businesses:
[I]n the 81 countries that had a net positive job creation ... the job creation
share for firms with less than 100 employees ranges from 67.5% in upper-
middle income countries (median) to 95.4% in low income countries... [, and
even in] 17 countries that had a net job loss ... the smallest firms with less
than 100 employees are creating jobs.
Id. at 14.
263. Caplan, supra note 243, at 298.
264. See OECD OUTLOOK, supra note 25, at 16 ("SMEs [including
microenterprises] constitute the dominant form of business organisation in all
countries world-wide, accounting for over 95% and up to 99% of the business
population depending on the country."); id. at 42 ("Up to two-thirds of micro-
enterprises (<10 employees) are not internationalized, compared to one third of
medium-sized enterprises .... Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a vehicle for SME
internationalisation, although for most countries, only a fraction (1-4% of European-19
SMEs) have established subsidiaries abroad.").
265. I might add that ICSID's own premise is essentially theoretical. The
empirical jury is still out. For a compilation of jousting empirical studies on the related
question of whether BITs contribute to investment, see generally KARL P. SAUVANT &
LISA E. SACHS, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P.
Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). For some other empirical support for ICSID's
premises, see generally Peter Egger & Hannes Winner, Does Contract Risk Impede
Foreign Direct Investment?, 139 Swiss J. ECON. & STAT. 155 (2003) (arguing that the
viability of contracts correlates with FDI inflows); Iris Kesternich & Monika Schnitzer,
Who Is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and Their Choice of Capital
Structure, 82 J. INT'L EcON. 208 (2010) (arguing that political risk has a negative
relationship with equity ownership by foreign investors); Tim Buthe & Helen V.
Milner, Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment:
Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971-2007,
Presentation to the American Political Science Association (Sept. 3, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1796506 (arguing that the strength of investment-related
dispute settlement mechanisms in preferential trade agreements correlates with FDI
inflows, although their coding appears not to distinguish between investor-state and
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has called for "a comprehensive survey of SME attitudes toward the
settlement of investment disputes," including "their perceptions about
the importance of investor-state arbitration in resolving investment
disputes, and whether they can effectively afford and utilize investor-
state arbitration," because at present, "[t]he scope of the problem is
unfortunately unknown. '26 6  Without a better empirical
understanding, we cannot know how many microinvestors are
dissuaded from bringing claims to ICSID-and why-and, even
worse, how many, are dissuaded from investing in developing
countries. 26 7 The ICSID decisions only reveal those microinvestment
disputes that have been brought to date, obscuring those not brought.
Anecdotal evidence (and common sense) suggests there are other
microinvestment disputes never submitted to ICSID.2 68 We can only
presume, for now, that Salini's burdens contribute to the dissuasion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like Horton the Elephant, ICSID tribunals should conclude that
investments are investments, no matter how small.269 They should
discard Salini's objective approach, or at least its development prong,
thereby honoring the Hippocratic injunction to "do no harm" to
microinvestors and the goal of development. The ICSID Convention
sets no minimum size requirement, and none is warranted by ICSID's
history or objectives. To the contrary, assuring that the doors to
ICSID remain open to microinvestment disputes serves ICSID's
values of depoliticization and development promotion.
state-state mechanisms). But see Axel Berger et al., More Stringent BITs, Less
Ambiguous Effects on FDI? Not a Bit!, 112 ECON. LETTERS 270, 272 (2011) (arguing
that data showing a correlation between FDI and the presence of investor-state
dispute settlement in BITs is attributable to the special circumstances of transitional
governments after the Cold War, when those governments actually tended to consent
to investor-state dispute settlement in only one narrow class of cases).
266. See Caplan, supra note 243, at 307, 311. Absent adequate empirical
evidence, Caplan also tempered his factual assertions. For example: "SMEs may not be
as successful in resolving disputes through non-legal means, such as negotiation. Thus,
when investment disputes arise, SMEs may place more stock in investor-state
arbitration than larger enterprises." Id. at 302.
267. One reviewer, inspired by the epigraph, called these unknowns "the
elephant in the room."
268. Caplan, supra note 243, at 303 ("The author's own experiences in the
field-which include investment disputes involving SMEs that ICSID would not
necessarily know about-confirm the existence of these two kinds of barriers [expense
of arbitration and access to expert counsel] for at least some SMEs.").
269. DR. SEUSS, supra note 1.
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More fundamentally, ICSID exists to help move the reality of the
international community toward community values. 270 Rejecting
Salini's development prong serves such core community values as
equal access to justice, fairness, pacta sunt servanda, peaceful
settlement of disputes, and the rule of law. It also helps to move
international society toward transnational society with a meaningful
ability by private persons-no matter how small-to protect their
own rights and interests. 271
270. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984)
("Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state power to bring a
recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.").
271. See sources cited supra note 44.
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